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I. Introduction 
 One of the principal victims in the United States’ so-called 
“war on terror” has been the independence of the U.S. Judiciary. 
Time and again, challenges to assertedly illegal conduct on the 
part of government officials have been turned aside, either 
because of overt deference to the government or because of special 
doctrines such as the state secrets privilege and standing 
requirements. I have even described the behavior of the United 
States since 9/11 as a “war on the rule of law.”1 
This Article catalogs the principal cases first by the nature of 
the government action challenged and then by the special 
doctrines invoked. What I attempt to show is that the Judiciary 
has virtually relinquished its valuable role in the U.S. system of 
governance, which depends on judicial review. In the face of 
governmental claims of crisis and national security needs, the 
courts have refused to examine, or have examined with undue 
deference, the actions of government officials. Oddly enough, the 
mostly Republican Supreme Court has shown more stiff 
                                                                                                     
 1. Wayne McCormack, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 5095, 5110 (2010). 
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resistance than most of the lower courts,2 but still has ducked 
some significant issues.3 
In the cases considered here, the U.S. government has taken 
the position that inquiry by the Judiciary into a variety of actions 
against alleged malfeasors would threaten the safety of the 
nation.4 This is pressure that amounts to intimidation. When this 
level of pressure is mounted to create exceptions to established 
rules of law, it undermines due process of law.  
Perhaps one or two examples of government warnings about 
the consequences of a judicial decision would be within the 
domain of legal argument. But a long pattern of threats and 
intimidation to depart from established law undermines judicial 
independence. That has been the course of the U.S. “war on 
terror” for over a decade now. 
II. The Actions Challenged 
What follows is simply a list of the governmental actions that 
have been challenged and a brief statement of how the courts 
responded to government demands for deference. 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514, 529 (2004), rev’g 316 F.3d 
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s unfettered deference to the 
Executive in determining a detainee’s “enemy combatant” status, yet accepting 
the Government’s contention that full criminal procedures would unduly burden 
military officials). 
 3. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446–47 (2004) (dismissing a U.S. 
citizen’s habeas petition challenging his “enemy combatant” status because he 
had filed his petition outside the district of confinement); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009) (describing Iqbal as a Muslim Pakistani who was 
labeled by the FBI as an individual “of high interest” in the 9/11 investigations). 
 4. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 622 (2006) (rejecting the 
Government’s contention that the danger posed by international terrorism 
serves as a sufficient reason to deny traditional criminal procedures in military 
commission proceedings); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 
2010) (agreeing with the Government that the Executive’s decision to kill a U.S. 
citizen deemed a terrorist threat remains judicially unreviewable). 
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A. Guantanamo 
In Boumediene v. Bush,5 the Supreme Court allowed the 
United States to detain alleged “terrorists” under unstated 
standards to be developed by the lower courts with “deference” to 
Executive determinations.6 The intimidation exerted on the Court 
was reflected in Justice Scalia’s injudicious comment that the 
Court’s decision would “certainly cause more Americans to be 
killed.”7 
B. Detention and Torture 
Khalid El-Masri8 claimed that he was detained in Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black sites” and tortured.9 His case 
was dismissed under the doctrine of “state secrets privilege” 
(SSP).10 
Maher Arar11 is a Canadian citizen who was detained at 
John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport by U.S. authorities, shipped off to 
Syria for imprisonment and mistreatment, and finally released to 
Canadian authorities.12 His case was dismissed under the 
“special factors” exception to tort actions for violations of law by 
                                                                                                     
 5. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 6. Id. at 796.  
 7. Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 8. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(describing El-Masri as a German citizen of Lebanese descent, who was 
detained by Macedonian officials before being transferred to CIA custody).  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 300, 312 (agreeing with the Executive that classified information 
was “so central to the action that it cannot be fairly litigated without 
threatening . . . disclosure”).    
 11. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(explaining that Arar, a Syrian native domiciled in Ottawa, Canada, was 
detained by immigration officials while returning to Montreal from a family trip 
to Tunisia), aff’d, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 12. Id. at 252–55. 
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federal officials.13 Arar was awarded $10.5 million by Canadian 
authorities.14 
Jose Padilla15 was arrested deplaning at O’Hare Airport, 
imprisoned in the United States for three and a half years 
without a hearing and allegedly mistreated in prison.16 His case 
was dismissed on grounds of “good faith” immunity.17 
Binyam Mohamed18 was subjected to so-called enhanced 
interrogation techniques at several CIA “black site[s]” before 
being repatriated to England,19 which awarded him £ 1 million in 
damages.20 The U.S. suit was dismissed under SSP.21 
                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 279, 287 (precluding a substantive due process claim arising from 
“torture, coercive interrogation, and detention in Syria” that implicates national 
security and foreign policy decisions that should remain with the political 
branches).  
 14. See Randall Palmer, Canada to Pay Arar $10.5 Million for Syria 
Ordeal, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2007, 3:45 PM), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/26/AR2007012600402.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2014) (“Canada apologized on Friday to software engineer Maher Arar 
who was deported to Syria by U.S. agents after Canadian police labeled him an 
Islamic extremist, and paid him $10.5 million in compensation.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2012) (identifying 
Padilla as an American citizen who was declared an enemy combatant due to 
alleged associations with al Qaeda).  
 16. Id. at 751–52. 
 17. See id. at 762 (concluding that, due to Padilla’s “enemy combatant” 
status, the Justice Department official allegedly responsible for his 
mistreatment had no reason to know that Padilla enjoyed constitutional 
protections).  
 18. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (describing Mohamed as an Ethiopian citizen residing in the 
United Kingdom who was apprehended on immigration charges in Pakistan). 
 19. Id. at 1075. 
 20. See Patrick Wintour, Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Be Paid 
Compensation by UK Government, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-bay-compensation-
claim (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (reporting that the Government had reached a 
settlement with Mohamed and other Guantanamo detainees to compensate 
them for British involvement in their detention and treatment at Guantanamo) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).     
 21. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1086 (finding the Government’s claim of 
privilege proper due to the threat that compelled or inadvertent disclosures of 
classified information in the course of litigation may “seriously harm legitimate 
national security interests”). 
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C. Unlawful Detentions 
Abdullah al-Kidd22 was arrested as a material witness, held 
in various jails for two weeks, and then confined to house arrest 
for fifteen months. His suit was dismissed on grounds of 
“qualified immunity” and apparent validity of material witness 
warrant.23 
Ali al-Marri was originally charged with perjury, then 
detained as an enemy combatant, for a total detention of four 
years before the Fourth Circuit finally held that he must be 
released or tried.24 
Javad Iqbal25 was detained on visa violations in New York 
following 9/11 and claimed he was subjected to mistreatment on 
the basis of ethnic profiling.26 His suit was dismissed on grounds 
that he could not prove Attorney General authorization of illegal 
practices and because the Court was unwilling to divert the 
attention of officials away from national security.27 
Osama Awadallah28 was taken into custody in Los Angeles 
after his name and phone number were found on a gum wrapper 
in the car of one of the 9/11 hijackers.29 He was charged with 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011) (explaining that al-
Kidd, a U.S. citizen, was arrested and detained when checking in for his flight to 
Saudi Arabia).  
 23. See id. at 2085 (finding that the Attorney General did not violate a 
clearly established Fourth Amendment right when he pursued the “objectively 
reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly 
obtained warrant”).  
 24. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) (“To sanction 
such presidential authority to order the military to seize and indefinitely detain 
civilians, even if the President calls them ‘enemy combatants,’ would have 
disastrous consequences for the Constitution—and the country.”). 
 25. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009). 
 26. Id. at 668–69. 
 27. See id. at 683 (finding that Iqbal’s complaint fails to demonstrate any 
discrimination on the basis of religion or national origin and only shows that “in 
the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack,” law enforcement aimed to 
detain “suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available”).  
 28. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting the district court’s conclusions that the material witness statute did 
not apply to grand jury witnesses and that Awadallah’s detention violated the 
requirements of the statute). 
 29. Id. at 45. 
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perjury before a grand jury and held as a material witness.30 The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that the 
government had abused the material witness statute.31 
D. Unlawful Surveillance 
Amnesty International32 is one of numerous organizations 
that brought suit believing that its communications, especially 
with foreign clients or correspondents, had been monitored by the 
National Security Agency (NSA).33 Its suit was dismissed because 
the secrecy of the NSA spying program made it impossible to 
prove that any particular person or group had been monitored.34  
The validity of the entire Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA)35 rests on the “special needs” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment,36 a conclusion that was rejected by one district 
court37 although accepted by others.38 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 48. 
 31. Id. at 49, 64; see also In re Grand Jury Material Witness Detention, 271 
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (D. Or. 2003) (“I conclude that a grand jury proceeding 
constitutes a ‘criminal proceeding,’ as the term is used in § 3144.”); In re United 
States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (declining to follow the district court’s holding in Awadallah by 
determining that the material witness statute should apply to grand jury 
witnesses). 
 32. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (finding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing due to the “speculative chain of possibilities” 
offered in support of their allegations against the government).  
 33. Id. at 1145–46. 
 34. Supra note 32. 
 35. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1812 (2012)).   
 36. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (stating 
that the Supreme Court has recognized an exception for “warrantless” and 
“suspicionless searches” under the Fourth Amendment, when such searches 
serve the government’s “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement”). 
 37. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007) 
(finding that the special needs exception does not apply to FISA when law 
enforcement officers seek to conduct searches for ordinary criminal 
investigations). 
 38. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“[A]ll other courts that have considered the issue . . . have rejected 
constitutional challenges to FISA.”); United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-
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E. Targeted Killing 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi (or Al-Aulaqi)39 was reported by press 
accounts as having been placed on a “kill list” by President 
Obama.40 A suit by his father was dismissed on grounds that 
Anwar himself could come forward and seek access to U.S. 
courts.41 Not only Anwar but also his son was then killed in 
separate drone strikes.42 
F. Asset Forfeiture 
The Justice Department has found both Al Haramain Islamic 
Foundation and KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian 
Development to be fronts for raising money for Hamas, and their 
assets have been blocked.43 Despite findings of due process 
violations by the lower courts, the blocking of assets has been 
upheld on the basis that their support for terrorist activities is 
public knowledge.44 
                                                                                                     
4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119470, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (declining to 
follow the district court’s decision in Mayfield that FISA violates the Fourth 
Amendment).  
 39. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing 
Al-Aulaqi as a U.S.–Yemeni citizen and Muslim cleric who was born and 
educated in the United States before moving to Yemen in 2004).  
 40. Id. at 11.  
 41. See id. at 17 (rejecting the father’s argument that Al-Aulaqi must 
remain in hiding due to the “threat of death” that has rendered him unable to 
appear before the court).  
 42. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta: Lawsuit Challenging Targeted Killings, AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-
panetta (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing the killings as a part of a larger 
U.S. government program to target suspected terrorists outside of armed 
conflict) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 
965, 970 (9th Cir. 2011); Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642–43 (N.D. Ohio 2010).  
 44. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 989  (finding that, 
although the government violated the foundation’s due process rights by 
refusing to provide notice before freezing its assets, such error did not prejudice 
the government’s determination); Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 
Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d at  660 (determining that the government could remedy its 
due process violations by disclosing judicially approved classified evidence and 
providing Kindhearts an opportunity to respond).  
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G. Summary of Actions Challenged 
The Guantanamo cases are a good starting point because 
they show the Supreme Court answering government demands 
for extreme deference with a modicum of deference but also a 
claim of judicial review authority.45 The version of judicial review 
adopted by the Court for the Guantanamo detentions ultimately 
resulted in a watered-down form of review that does not 
eliminate judicial independence entirely, but does allow a high 
degree of deference to Executive determinations. 
After looking at the Guantanamo decisions, I want to 
illustrate the more extreme versions of deference for domestic 
detentions by reference to several cases in which individuals have 
been detained for years without any degree of judicial oversight.46 
And then there are the basic underpinnings of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which depends first on the “special 
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment,47 but then in 
individual cases relies on virtually unreviewable statements by 
government agents.48 
III. The Lore of Judicial Independence 
Much of this Article will deal with the ways in which 
American courts have ducked (avoided, if that is a more neutral 
term) claims challenging the legality of official action in the wake 
of terrorism. Before turning to that discussion, it is worth taking 
a brief look at what commentators and courts have said about the 
issue of judicial independence, both domestically and 
                                                                                                     
 45. See infra Part IV.B (demonstrating that in the Guantanamo cases the 
courts have spoken in deferential terms and sanctioned unusual procedures, 
while retaining a degree of judicial independence). 
 46. See infra Part IV.C (discussing two cases in which detainees labeled as 
“enemy combatants” remained in confinement for several years before obtaining 
judicial review). 
 47. See infra Part IV.E (analyzing how a majority of courts have excused 
warrantless government surveillance under FISA, by reasoning that threats of 
violence give rise to special needs in law enforcement). 
 48. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(finding that surveillance information gathered under FISA qualified for the 
national security exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, precluding 
public access to such documents). 
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internationally. The latter point is part of how the U.S. courts’ 
avoidance has damaged the American global presence both 
legally and politically. I hasten to add at the outset this caveat: 
the discussion of the Justice Case from Nuremberg49 will show 
emphatically that the American judges have not been complicit in 
criminal activity but simply have shied away from their 
traditional judicial review function over Executive action. What 
remains is for the future to determine how and when that role 
might be resumed.  
I have no doubt that no Justice or judge has received ex parte 
pressure or instruction from a member of the U.S. government. I 
firmly believe that an Article III judge would cry “foul” at the 
slightest hint of interference from the Executive. On the other 
hand, judges are people and they do like friendship. Some of the 
holdings described here have taken a very pro-government stance 
in situations when the judge could have been more vigorous in 
asserting the rights of the individual. The failure to stand up for 
the little guy is what concerns me about the role of the courts and 
their loss of judicial independence. 
A. Righting the Ship of State 
Numerous American commentators have pointed out that 
courts tend to defer to the Executive during times of perceived 
emergencies, and most of the commentators carry at least the 
hope, if not the promise, that civil liberties will be restored when 
the crisis has passed.50 Specifically, long before 9/11, Justice 
                                                                                                     
 49. See United States v. Alstötter, 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (1948), 
14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law: 
icl/485us47.case.1/law-icl-485us47?rskey=d0BpL5&result=2&prd=OPIL  
(finding that a judge’s active participation in the program of racial 
extermination developed by the Nazi Party constituted criminal activity).  
 50. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1042 (2004) (describing a common law cycle in which judges demonstrate 
flexibility in interpreting emergency powers during crises, but after the crisis 
abates, initiate an “agonizing reappraisal, casting doubt upon . . . their 
momentary permissiveness”); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The 
Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1785 (2004) (rejecting 
the use of “suspicionless preventative detentions” during emergencies as a way 
to reassure the public due to the underlying premise that people are “objects 
whose liberty can be taken without regard to any threat they pose”); Oren 
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
U.S. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 315 
William Brennan had acknowledged that the “Ship of State” may 
right itself as the crisis eases, but asserted that the ship would 
tend to founder again in the next crisis.51 
Looking at the picture from the perspective of courts other 
than the United States, Professor Shimon Shetreet subscribes 
explicitly to the “ship of state righting itself” view: 
International Jurisprudence has shown in the beginning of this 
century, after the 9/11 attacks, complete acceptance of executive 
and legislative emergency measures against terror. However, in 
later years courts showed a very strict approach toward 
executive and legislative counterterrorism measures. The 
general pattern in most jurisdictions has been to broaden the 
scope of judicial review of executive decisions in matters of 
national security.52 
Professor Shetreet rightly points to Canadian and U.K. court 
decisions striking down extrajudicial detention measures.53 Chief 
                                                                                                     
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003) (“[I]n states of emergency, 
national courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review 
governmental actions and decisions.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. 
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1867 (2004) 
(asserting that when courts make constitutional compromises in times of 
emergency, such precedents will eventually “come back to haunt us”); Mark 
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 
WIS. L. REV. 273, 287 (recognizing a common understanding of how government 
wartime policies affect civil liberties: “The government acts, the courts endorse 
or acquiesce, and . . . society reaches a judgment that the actions were 
unjustified and the courts were mistaken”). Perhaps the most direct apologia for 
full deference is offered by George Alexander in The Illusory Protection of 
Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. 
L.J. 1, 25 (1984), which explains that the judiciary’s deference to the Executive 
and military in times of national emergency recognizes that “they must deal 
with extremely complex issues without the luxury of fact-finding.” 
 51. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of 
Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (1988), 
http://www.hofstra.edu/PDF/law_civil_hafetz_article1.pdf (“So far the United 
States has fortunately been able to restore a democratic and constitutional 
regime after each crisis . . . . [but] ‘[t]his nation, as experience has proved, 
cannot always remain at peace . . . .’” (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 
(1866))). 
 52. See Shimon Shetreet, Law and Counter Terror: The Shifting Trends of 
Judicial Jurisprudence on Human Rights in the Face of Terror (Dec. 2010) 
(unpublished paper delivered at International Conference of Jurists in New 
Delhi) (on file with author). 
 53. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 356 (Can.) (finding that 
“the lack of review of the detention of foreign nationals” under the Immigration 
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Justice Barak authored opinions for the Israeli High Court in cases 
involving torture54 and targeted killings.55 On the general issue of 
judicial deference in the face of terror threats, Barak commented: 
The security oriented character of administrative discretion 
restricted judicial review in the past. Judges are not members of 
the security establishment and they should refrain from 
interfering in security considerations. Over the years it has 
been held that security considerations are not unique insofar as 
judicial review is concerned. Judges are not administrators, yet 
the principle of separation of powers requires that they review 
the lawfulness of administrative decisions. In this regard, 
security considerations do not enjoy a different status.56 
Optimism is welcome. And predictions of judicial recovery may 
well come to pass. But unfortunately, in the past decade, the U.S. 
Ship of State has been severely damaged and will require 
extensive repairs before it will set sail confidently again. As Justice 
Brennan said, the ship will founder again, but the question of the 
moment is whether it can even be righted in the short term. 
B. U.S. Views on Judicial Independence 
Even before the watershed case of Marbury v. Madison,57 the 
U.S. Supreme Court had staked out its position on judicial 
independence in Chief Justice Jay’s answer to President 
Washington’s request for an assessment of the validity of a 
particular treaty provision.58 The implication of Jay’s reliance on 
                                                                                                     
and Refugee Protection Act “until 120 days after the reasonableness of the 
certificate has been judicially confirmed infringes the guarantee against 
arbitrary detention”); A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, 
[42], [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 (Eng.) (rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that 
deference owed to Parliament and the executive in the face of national threats 
precludes judicial review of the basis for the detention).  
 54. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. General Security 
Service 53 (4) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.). 
 55. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 57(6) PD 285 
[2005] (Isr.). 
 56. H.C. 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) P.D. 617 [1989] 
(Isr.). 
 57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury recognizes the authority of the Judiciary to 
review Executive and Legislative action. Id. at 177.  
 58. See 3 JOHN JAY, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, 
1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1893) 
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separation of powers was that the Court could become caught up in 
administrative matters and become subject to the political 
pressures of the Executive if it entered into giving opinions outside 
the course of litigation.  
As is now well known, the Supreme Court asserted in 
Marbury that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”59 This statement 
followed a lengthy discussion of the difference between discretion 
and duty on the part of the Executive60 and another discussion of 
the reasons why the legislature cannot be allowed to be the judge 
of the validity of its own action.61 Of even more significance for 
present purposes, however, is the passage in which Chief Justice 
Marshall discussed the role of the judges themselves: 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to 
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms 
no rule for his government? [I]f it is closed upon him, and 
cannot be inspected by him? If such be the real state of things, 
this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take 
this oath, becomes equally a crime.62 
So if a judge refuses to decide a case in which an act of the 
Executive is alleged to be illegal, does Marshall mean to say that 
it would be a crime for the judge to refuse to decide the case? He 
implies something like that a bit later in Cohens v. Virginia63: 
                                                                                                     
[T]he lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three 
departments of the government. . . . being in certain respects checks 
upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are 
considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of 
our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to . . . . 
 59. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 60. See id. at 166 (concluding that the Judiciary may examine the acts of a 
government officer when “he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts” 
and “the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts”).  
 61. See id. at 174 (stating that, if the legislature possessed the authority to 
override constitutional provisions, the structures established by the constitution 
would be “form without substance”). This discussion borrowed almost verbatim 
from THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) without attribution. 
 62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). 
 63. 19 U.S. 264 (1821) In Cohens, the Court determined that the nature of 
federalism does not restrict the judiciary from “construing the words of the 
constitution” in reviewing state court constitutional decisions. Id. at 416.  
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It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction 
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid 
a measure because it approaches the confines of the 
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With 
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be 
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have 
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution.64 
From Marshall’s discussion of the “case or controversy” 
requirement,65 it is true that the federal courts have drawn some 
confines around their own power in the form of requirements for 
justiciability. Thus, the courts will not hear a case brought by a 
party who has no standing, either because of lack of an “injury 
in fact,”66 or because the injury is not “judicially redressable.”67 
Nor will the courts hear a “political question,”68 by which the 
courts primarily mean a matter that has “a textually 
demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”69 Nor will 
the Court hear a case that is either not yet ripe70 or already 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 404. 
 65. See id. at 305 (distinguishing between the cases over which courts may 
exercise their judicial powers from questions that may possess a judicial 
character, but do not arise between contesting parties).  
 66. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating 
that at a minimum for injury-in-fact the constitution requires the plaintiff to 
have suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” 
(citations omitted)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (phrasing the 
proper injury-in-fact inquiry as whether “the injury [is] too abstract, or 
otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable”).  
 67. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 
(2011) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing due to the purely speculative 
conclusion that any judicial action against “a government expenditure or tax 
benefit would result in any actual tax relief” to the plaintiffs (quotations 
omitted)); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) 
(finding that no “case or controversy” exists where the plaintiff has failed to 
show that the injury suffered “is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision”).  
 68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (explaining that the political 
question doctrine arises from the proper distribution of powers between the 
separate branches under the constitution).  
 69. Id. at 216. Although this is only one of six factors listed in Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Baker, on further analysis, this one factor pretty much 
subsumes all the others. 
 70. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., 
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moot.71 It is possible to be harshly critical of the standing, 
ripeness, and political question doctrine decisions without 
denying that the courts have no business injecting themselves 
into matters reserved to the political branches. As I have argued 
elsewhere, all that the justiciability myth properly stands for is 
the proposition that the complainant should lose if the 
complainant has no legally cognizable claim.72 
None of that bears on the issue of judicial independence. 
When it comes to taking direction from the political branches, the 
Supreme Court has jealously guarded the freestanding role of the 
Article III courts. Perhaps the leading case on this point is 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,73 
in which the Court struck down the creation of Bankruptcy 
Courts in which judges would exercise judicial power akin to that 
of an Article III judge.74  
Meanwhile, the Court has upheld the placing of judges on the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission,75 has permitted Judicial 
                                                                                                     
concurring) (stating that the political branches cannot seek judicial resolution of 
disputes between them until they allow the “normal political process” to resolve 
the issue); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–90 (1947) (“The 
power of courts . . . only arises when the interests of litigants require the use of 
this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A 
hypothetical threat is not enough.”).  
 71. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (concluding that 
when the plaintiff no longer required a decision of the court to compel his 
desired outcome, the controversy between the parties lost the “definite and 
concrete” character appropriate for judicial resolution); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 125 (1973) (finding that the termination of the plaintiff’s pregnancy did not 
render moot the challenge to Texas’s criminal abortion statute because 
pregnancy fell within an exception to the mootness doctrine).  
 72. See Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of 
Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 596 (1986) [hereinafter McCormack, The 
Justiciability Myth] (asserting that the court’s decision to dismiss a case under a 
justiciability doctrine effectively “hides a decision on the merits without 
elaborating the reasons behind the decision”).  
 73. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 74. See id. at 87 (“We conclude that . . . the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has 
impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial 
power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-
Art. III adjunct.”). 
 75. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (“[W]e conclude 
that the principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit Article III 
judges from serving on commissions such as that created by the Act.”). 
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Conferences to remove judges from hearing cases,76 and has 
permitted judges to appoint special prosecutors in politically 
sensitive cases.77 In all of these cases, however, the Court 
carefully assured itself that the action involved no threat to the 
judicial independence of the courts.78 
Finally, there is the matter of the “legislative courts,” such as 
in the territories and a few specialized “courts” that operate 
under the supervision of the Article III courts. The authority for 
these entities was found early by Chief Justice Marshall in the 
pragmatics of governance structures for territories not yet 
admitted to statehood.79 As the Court explained later,  
as the absence of a federal structure in the territories 
produced problems not foreseen by the Framers of Article III, 
the realities of territorial government typically made it less 
urgent that judges there enjoy the independence from 
Congress and the President envisioned by that article. For the 
territories were not ruled immediately from Washington; in a 
day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that they 
should be.80 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 89 
(1970) (implicitly allowing the Judicial Conference’s removal of a judge to stand 
by deciding that “petitioner has not made a case for the extraordinary relief of 
mandamus or prohibition”). 
 77. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (“In this case, however, 
we do not think it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint 
independent counsel in a specially created federal court.”). 
 78. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406 (“[T]he fact that Congress has included 
federal judges on the Commission does not itself threaten the integrity of the 
Judicial Branch.”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 684 (“We think both the special court 
and its judges are sufficiently isolated . . . so as to avoid any taint of the 
independence of the Judiciary such as would render the Act invalid under 
Article III.”); Chandler, 398 U.S. at 84 (“There . . . [is an] imperative need for 
total and absolute independence of judges . . . . But it is quite another matter to 
say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his 
manner of conducting judicial business.”). 
 79. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) 
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the 
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general 
government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. 
They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of 
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause 
which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, 
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. 
 80. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962). 
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For similar reasons, legislative courts have been created without 
life tenure for the judges in military courts-martial81 and the Tax 
Court,82 as well as numerous boards of appeals.83 In all of these 
situations, the Court has been careful to point out that the 
creation of the “court” is either specifically mentioned in Article I 
(governance of the armed forces)84 or the court is without general 
judicial authority,85 meaning that it is acting only for limited 
purposes subject to review by an Article III court. 
The bottom line for the purpose of reviewing the judicial 
behavior with respect to a particular subject, such as terrorism, is 
that the U.S. Judiciary has zealously guarded its independence 
from the Executive or Legislative Branches.86 The judges can be 
impeached only for misconduct in office.87 Their salaries cannot be 
reduced.88 They are bound by judicial ethics not to discuss cases 
ex parte.89 They are not even subject to security clearances before 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994) (“Congress has . . . 
chosen not to give tenure to military judges.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 826 (2013) 
(outlining the roles of military judges). 
 82. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e) (2012) (“The term of office of any judge of the 
Tax Court shall expire 15 years after he takes office.”). 
 83. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7101A (2012) (Board of Veterans’ Appeals);  5 
U.S.C. § 1202 (2012) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) 
(National Labor Relations Board). 
 84. See, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 166–67 (“Pursuant to Article I of the 
Constitution, Congress has established three tiers of military courts.”). 
 85. See, e.g., C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (“The Tax Court is a 
court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers.”). 
 86. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“These 
doctrines help to ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch by precluding 
debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political 
Branches . . . .”). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and 
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).  
 88. See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall . . . 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.”). 
 89. See Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 3(A)(4) (2011), JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx (last updated June 2, 
2011) [hereinafter Judicial Code of Conduct] (“[A] judge should not initiate, 
permit, or consider ex parte communications or consider other communications 
concerning a pending or impending matter that are made outside the presence 
of the parties or their lawyers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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receiving classified information in the course of their duties 
(although their court personnel are so confined).90 A 1997 ABA 
blue-ribbon commission investigated the tension between judicial 
independence and accountability.91 The Commission reaffirmed 
the importance of keeping the Judiciary free of control by the 
political branches, and even went so far as to express concern 
that too-harsh and unwarranted criticism of judicial “activism” 
could blunt the vitality of the tripartite system.92 
Under no circumstances would an Article III judge imagine 
being given directions by a member of the Executive Branch.93 
Yet, time and again, the courts have yielded to arguments that 
decision in a case would jeopardize national security interests 
when a neutral observer would be hard-pressed to see how that 
could be possible. 
C. Judicial Independence and International Law 
The International Association of Judicial Independence and 
World Peace has promulgated standards demanding that “in the 
discharge of his judicial function, a judge is subject to nothing but 
the law and the commands of his conscience.”94 Further, judges 
                                                                                                     
 90. See United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 1990) 
[D]istrict courts retain sufficient power to preclude the Executive 
from engaging in procedures that intrude upon . . . the judicial 
function . . . . We therefore hold that the Executive Branch may 
conduct reasonable background investigations, subject to district 
court review, of judicial personnel before such personnel are cleared 
to work on a case involving classified information. 
 91. See COMM’N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, AN INDEP. JUDICIARY 1 (1997), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/government_affairs_office/indepenjud.
authcheckdam.pdf (“The Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial 
Independence was . . . created to study judicial independence and accountability, 
to evaluate a number of recent events perceived by some as threatening judicial 
independence, and to make recommendations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 92. See id. at 46 (“[A]ccusations of ‘judicial activism’ have been wielded . . . . 
These developments have a potentially deleterious effect on the courts’ decision-
making independence.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Smith, 899 F.2d at 569 (“Under no circumstances should the 
Judiciary become the handmaiden of the Executive. The independence of the 
Judiciary must be jealously guarded at all times against efforts by prosecutors 
to erode its authority.”). 
 94. Mt. Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial 
U.S. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 323 
“should have unfettered freedom to decide cases impartially, in 
accordance with their conscience and their interpretation of the 
facts, and in pursuance of the prevailing rules of the law.”95 The 
Montreal Declaration of 1983 emphasizes in several ways the 
importance to the world community of the Rule of Law and due 
process.96 
Before going any further, I feel it is important to emphasize 
that I see no way in which judges of the United States could be 
said to have violated international criminal standards by ceding 
so much of their responsibilities to the Executive. It is quite likely 
that crimes have been committed by the Executive Branch in the 
name of national security. Many observers have called for 
prosecution of political leaders, who usually are accused by 
detractors of “war crimes”97 although many of the crimes such as 
torture and extrajudicial detentions occurred outside any 
recognizable context of war. Thus, they should be cognizable 
under either ordinary domestic law or international 
humanitarian law. 
                                                                                                     
Independence § 2.2.2, INT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. & WORLD PEACE (Mar. 19, 
2008), http://www.jiwp.org/#!mt-scopus-standards/c14de (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 95. Id. § 8.4. 
 96. See Montreal Declaration, INT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD 
PEACE (June 10, 1983), http://www.jiwp.org/#!montreal-deceleration-1983/cmmd 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
§ 103 Judges and courts shall be free in the performance of their 
duties to ensure that the Rule of Law is observed, and shall not admit 
influence from any government or any other authority external to 
their statutes and the interests of international justice. 
§ 1.05 Judges shall enjoy freedom of thought and, in the exercise of 
their duties, shall avoid being influenced by any considerations other 
than those of international justice. 
§1.08 Judges shall promote the principle of the due process of law as 
being an integral part of the independence of justice. 
 97. See Jordan J. Paust, Prosecuting the President and His Entourage, 14 
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 539, 539 (2008) 
During his so-called “war on terror,” President Bush has authorized 
and ordered manifest violations of customary and treaty-based 
international law . . . . [T]he President’s 2002 memorandum 
authorized and ordered the denial of treatment required by the 
Geneva Conventions and, therefore, necessarily authorized and 
ordered violations of the Geneva Conventions—which are war crimes.  
(footnotes omitted). 
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The question to be answered here is whether the judges who 
refused to grant relief against the wrongful actions of government 
officials could be charged with criminal behavior. The most 
salient precedent, of course, is the Justice Case98 from Military 
Tribunal #3 at Nuremberg. The United States convened a 
Military Tribunal for the purpose of prosecuting sixteen judges 
who were charged with having been complicit in the crimes 
against humanity committed by the Nazi regime.99 Specifically, 
they were charged with participating in the “common design or 
conspiracy” of racial persecution.100 According to the indictment, 
5. It was a part of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, 
and enterprises to enact, issue, enforce, and give effect to 
certain purported statutes, decrees, and orders, which were 
criminal both in inception and execution, and to work with the 
Gestapo, SS, SD, SIPO, and RSHA for criminal purposes, in 
the course of which the defendants, by distortion and denial of 
judicial and penal process, committed the murders, brutalities, 
cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts . . . . 
                                                                                                     
 98. The Library of Congress website contains in one volume all the 
pleadings, the transcript, and the court opinions. III TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1951) [hereinafter NUREMBERG 
TRIALS], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-
III.pdf.  
 99. See generally INGO MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE (1991). This trial served 
as the model for the fictitious version in the movie Judgment at Nuremberg. In 
particular, the movie explored the ethical dilemma of a judge who stayed in 
office and sentenced some people to death because he believed that his 
resignation would result in the appointment of an even more brutal adherent of 
the regime. That character was based on Judge Schlegelberger. See Michael 
Asimow, Judges Judging Judges—Judgment at Nuremberg, U.S.F. (1998), 
http://usf.usfca.edu/pj//articles/Nuremberg.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) 
(“Judgment at Nuremberg is based on the third Nuremberg trial . . . . Janning is 
a conglomeration of several actual defendants, including Franz Schlegelberger 
who was formerly undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 100. See NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 98, at 15  
The United States of America . . . charges that the defendants herein 
participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit and did 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in 
Control Council Law No. 10, duly enacted by the Allied Control 
Council on 20 December 1945. These crimes included murders, 
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, plunder of private property, 
and other inhumane acts, as set forth in counts one, two, and three of 
this indictment. 
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7. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises 
embraced the use of the judicial process as a powerful weapon 
for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the 
Nazi regime regardless of nationality and for the persecution 
and extermination of “races.”101 
Evidence in the case was heard over a period of eleven 
months and resulted in a 10,000-page transcript with hundreds of 
written exhibits along with oral testimony.102 In essence, ten of 
the judges were found to have taken an active part in the 
Holocaust events,103 some by drafting legislation granting special 
powers to the regime,104 some by replacing judges who were not 
compliant,105 and some by issuing death sentences that were 
manifestly unwarranted by the evidence in the individual 
cases.106 The most interesting aspect of the case involved the role 
of Judge Schlegelberger, a very prominent member of the 
Judiciary who “was put in charge of the Reich Ministry of Justice 
as administrative Secretary of State” but eventually resigned.107 
He testified that he often found the demands of the Nazi Party to 
be “difficult,” but there was evidence that “Hitler was at least 
attempting to reward Schlegelberger for good and faithful service 
rendered in the performance of some of which Schlegelberger 
committed both war crimes and crimes against humanity as 
charged in the indictment.”108 
As an example of his support for the regime’s dispensing with 
the Rule of Law, the court cited a speech in which Schlegelberger 
stated: 
In the sphere of criminal law the road to a creation of justice in 
harmony with the moral concepts of the new Reich has been 
opened up by a new wording of section 2 of the criminal code, 
whereby a person is also (to) be punished even if his deed is 
not punishable according to the law, but if he deserves 
punishment in accordance with the basic concepts of criminal 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 17–18. 
 102. Id. at 4–5. 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. at 23. 
 105. Id. at 1021. 
 106. Id. at 19. 
 107. Id. at 1082.  
 108. Id.  
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law and the sound instincts of the people. This new definition 
became necessary because of the rigidity of the norm in force 
hitherto.109 
The Tribunal had this to say about his defense: 
Schlegelberger presents an interesting defense, which is also 
claimed in some measure by most of the defendants. He 
asserts that the administration of justice was under persistent 
assault by Himmler and other advocates of the police state. 
This is true. He contends that if the functions of the 
administration of justice were usurped by the lawless forces 
under Hitler and Himmler, the last state of the nation would 
be worse than the first. He feared that if he were to resign, a 
worse man would take his place. As the event proved, there is 
much truth in this also. Under Thierack the police did usurp 
the functions of the administration of justice and murdered 
untold thousands of Jews and political prisoners. Upon 
analysis this plausible claim of the defense squares neither 
with the truth, logic, or the circumstances. 
 The evidence conclusively shows that in order to maintain 
the Ministry of Justice in the good graces of Hitler and to 
prevent its utter defeat by Himmler's police, Schlegleberger 
and the other defendants who joined in this claim of 
justification took over the dirty work which the leaders of the 
State demanded, and employed the Ministry of Justice as a 
means for exterminating the Jewish and Polish populations, 
terrorizing the inhabitants of occupied countries, and wiping 
out political opposition at home. That their program of racial 
extermination under the guise of law failed to attain the 
proportions which were reached by the pogroms, deportations, 
and mass murders by the police is cold comfort to the survivors 
of the "judicial" process and constitutes a poor excuse before 
this Tribunal. The prostitution of a judicial system for the 
accomplishment of criminal ends involves an element of evil to 
the State which is not found in frank atrocities which do not 
sully judicial robes. 
 Schlegelberger resigned. The cruelties of the system 
which he had helped to develop were too much for him, but he 
resigned too late. The damage was done. If the judiciary could 
slay their thousands, why couldn't the police slay their tens of 
thousands? The consequences which Schlegelberger feared 
were realized. The police, aided by Thierack, prevailed. 
Schlegelbergcr had failed. His hesitant injustices no longer 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id.  
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satisfied the urgent demands of the hour. He retired under 
fire. In spite of all that he had done he still bore an unmerited 
reputation as the last of the German jurists and so Hitler gave 
him his blessing and 100,000 RM as a parting gift. We are 
under no misapprehension. Schlegelberger is a tragic 
character. He loved the life of intellect, the work of the scholar. 
We believe that he loathed the evil that he did, but he sold 
that intellect and that scholarship to Hitler for a mess of 
political pottage and for the vain hope of personal security. He 
is guilty [of war crimes and crimes against humanity] . . . .110 
This is a harsh judgment suited to harsh measures. In the 
United States of the past decade, despite the torture, the 
unjustified detentions, the unauthorized surveillance, and the 
targeted killings, it would not be credible to argue that a U.S. 
judge had participated in the “prostitution of a judicial system for 
the accomplishment of criminal ends.”111 For some reason, the 
Nazi regime enlisted the support of the Judiciary in its nefarious 
doings, a step that has not been taken in the U.S. terrorism 
context except for the highly questionable seeking of a FISA 
Court ruling that all electronic communications are “relevant” to 
terrorism investigations.112 
Moreover, the level of the atrocities committed in the Nazi 
Holocaust far outstrip the level of wrongdoing by the United 
States, although torture is still torture, whether one person or 
many. The difference, again, is that the U.S. courts have not been 
active participants in the wrongs—they have simply failed to 
prevent them—and if we ever encountered a threat of atrocities 
at the level of the Holocaust, even the most pessimistic observer 
could hope that the U.S. Judiciary would stand up and say “NO.” 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 1086–87. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things From, 
BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991, at *7 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) 
The government notes also that “[a]nalysts know that the terrorists’ 
communications are located somewhere” in the metadata produced 
under this authority, but cannot know where until the data is 
aggregated and then accessed . . . . As the government stated in its 
2006 Memorandum of Law, “[a]ll of the metadata collected is thus 
relevant, because the success of this investigative tool depends on 
bulk collection.”  
(citations omitted). This is a matter of privacy law that will be taken up under 
the heading of “Carte Blance for Electronic Snooping” below. Infra Part IV.F.   
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Some judges in the past decade turned blind eyes to the 
wrongs displayed before them.113 Some paid undue deference to 
the Executive.114 And at least one, Justice Scalia, skirted the 
bounds of propriety115 when he said the judgment of his 
colleagues would “cause more Americans to be killed.”116 
I think we can safely conclude that the examples of deference 
and the tolerance for wrongdoing by American judges in the past 
decade do not amount to criminal behavior under the standards 
of either domestic or international law. There is no hint that any 
judge has sentenced a person to an unwarranted death or 
imprisonment, nor has any judge been directly involved in the 
acquisition of excessive executive power.117 The most that can be 
said is that many judges have failed to stand firmly against 
encroachments on their traditional role of judicial review. I don’t 
see that as a violation of criminal standards. 
IV. Avoiding Accountability 
As indicated above, there are a variety of doctrines that have 
been used to keep the courts away from reviewing governmental 
actions in the name of combating terrorism. I want to review the 
use of the following six doctrines: 
1. Deference 
2. State Secrets Privilege (SSP) 
3. Qualified Immunity 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 2203, 2203 (2007) (“[J]udges have . . . presumed—seemingly sensibly—that 
the actions of military and executive officials were constitutional whenever they 
acted in the name of national security.”). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(“[T]he Court has deferred to the judgment of the Executive to preserve national 
security . . . .”). 
 115. See Judicial Code of Conduct, supra note 89, at Canon 3(A)(3) (“A judge 
should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official 
capacity.”). 
 116. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 117. Judge Bybee of the Ninth Circuit signed the infamous Yoo memoranda 
before he was appointed to the bench. Was there a political trade-off in 
obtaining his signature? Probably not anything overt, just the usual political 
cronyism of Washington politics. 
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4. “Special Factors” Exception 
5. “Special Need” Exception 
6. Standing 
A. Deference 
The word “deference” appears frequently in describing the 
judicial attitude toward an executive or legislative decision.118 As 
a general matter, there is nothing wrong with the idea of 
deference, although we need to distinguish among deference to 
findings of fact, deference to policy decisions, and deference on 
matters of law. It makes sense that a reviewing court accepts the 
factual findings of a political body if there is any “rational basis” 
for those findings.119 The most familiar example here is that the 
Supreme Court was able to find some evidentiary support for the 
proposition that a farmer’s use of homegrown wheat for 
commercial purposes affected interstate demand for wheat, and 
thus upheld federal regulation of homegrown wheat.120 Within 
                                                                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“When faced with a 
problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the 
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its 
administration.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 
(1981) (“States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their 
legislative judgments. Rather, ‘those challenging the legislative judgment must 
convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is 
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker.’” (citations omitted)); see also Day-Brite Lighting 
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (“The judgment of the legislature that 
time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a debatable 
one . . . . But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as 
respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision.”); 
Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258, 264–65 (1937) (“No facts have been 
found, or established by the evidence, which would justify us in pronouncing the 
action of the Legislature arbitrary . . . . The classification made has ample 
support in the evidence. We are unable to find in the regulation anything 
arbitrary or unreasonable.”). 
 120. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (stating Congress may 
regulate an activity “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce”); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (stating the 
Court should undertake to decide whether a rational basis exists for concluding 
that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce instead of 
accepting an unsupported conclusion by Congress that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce).  
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the realm of judicial review but still entitled to a significant level 
of deference would be Congressional findings that a particular 
activity has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.121 This 
form of deference is merely an expression of the degree to which a 
court is going to look behind findings of legislative fact by the 
body appropriately given responsibility for making those 
findings.122 
Similarly, acceptance of legislative policy decisions is simply 
recognition of the appropriate legislative role.123 An extreme 
example at the policy level would be a court’s acceptance of the 
legislature’s decision on the level of taxation for a particular 
activity—in that situation, we would go so far as to say that the 
decision is “committed to the authority of a coordinate branch” 
and conclude that it is a “political question” unfit for judicial 
review at all.124 
Other examples of deference occur in the realm of executive 
dealings in foreign affairs.125 The extreme is the unfettered 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, 22 (2005) (stating that the 
Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce” and the Court only had to determine whether Congress had a 
“rational basis” to regulate the same); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964) (stating that it “is within the sound and 
exclusive discretion of the Congress” to remove obstructions in commerce, 
however “it is subject only to one caveat” which is “that the means chosen by it 
must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution”). 
 122. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22 (“In assessing the scope of Congress’ 
authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a 
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in 
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether 
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”). 
 123. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (stating 
“the Legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the 
‘sweating system’ . . . [e]ven if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as 
debatable” as long as it is not “arbitrary and capricious”). 
 124. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; [or one of several other factors that all add up essentially to the 
same point that there is no “law” for a court to apply to the claim]. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936) (claiming broadly that the President is the “sole organ of the nation in its 
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ability of the President to recognize one entity as the legitimate 
government of another country.126 Congress has stated in no 
uncertain terms that the President has sole authority to control 
the export of arms to other countries127 and the courts have held 
in equally certain terms that they will not second-guess those 
decisions.128 Most relevant to the current issue are the authority 
of the State Department129 and Office of Foreign Asset Control to 
                                                                                                     
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations” (citation 
omitted)). 
 126. This power derives from the constitutional authority to “receive 
ambassadors,” and is rather universally recognized as solely within the domain 
of the President. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (relying on the ground that “the Constitution commits to the 
President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
regimes”). The presidential power to recognize one entity as the legitimate 
government of another nation was discussed in detail by the lower court. See 
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“It is undisputed 
that the Constitution gave the President full constitutional authority to 
recognize the PRC and to derecognize the ROC.” (footnote omitted)). 
 127. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he President is authorized to 
control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to 
provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the 
export and import of such articles and services.”). 
 128. See United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The Arms 
Export Control Act . . . authorizes the President to ‘designate those items which 
shall be considered as defense articles,’ and ‘promulgate regulations . . . .’” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“The statute under which Lee and Ray were convicted, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, 
authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense 
articles . . . .”); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1434 (8th Cir. 1987) 
There may be ambiguities and vagueness in these policy objectives, 
but the task of weighing and balancing the conflicting factors is 
committed by Congress to Executive discretion. As explained clearly 
by judge Zobel in United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550 
(D. Mass. 1983), Congress enumerated the factors which are to guide 
the discretion of the executive department, but “also clearly expressed 
its desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final 
word on which items should be restricted.” 
See also Cody Jones, Note, More Than an Assertion: How United States v. 
Pulungan Nudged the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Toward Increased 
Transparency, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 839, 846 (2012) (“Congress ‘clearly expressed its 
desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final word on which 
items should be restricted.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 129. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 
allowed the State Department to designate “foreign terrorist organization[s]” as 
to whom provision of any “material support” would become criminal under 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2004). 
332 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) 
designate persons and organizations as terrorist so that any 
transactions with them are criminal.130 The courts have repeatedly 
deferred to these designations based on the fact-finding ability of 
the agency,131 although there are due process concerns that allow 
designated organizations to rebut the allegations against them.132 
The most troubling aspect of this particular deference is the use of 
“classified information” by agencies making the designation, to 
which the courts have responded that the organization must have 
at least an opportunity to rebut the allegations against it, but thus 
far the cases have found sufficient basis in the public record to 
support the designations.133 This subject appeared in the 
discussion of “asset forfeiture” above.134 
With the exception of the terrorism designation cases, the 
examples above are thoroughly understandable and justifiable 
judicial deference to Executive or Legislative determinations. 
                                                                                                     
 130. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–1705 (2012) (granting sweeping power to the President). 
 131. See United States v. Afshari, 392 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (“That 
court may set aside the designation for the ordinary administrative law reasons, 
such as that the designation is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (footnote omitted)); People’s Mojahedin 
Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that 
“even the unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the 
Secretary’s determination” under AEDPA); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. 
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The district court correctly 
reviewed the actions of the Treasury Department under the highly deferential 
‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard . . . . Treasury’s decision to designate HLF as 
an SDGT was based on ample evidence in a massive administrative record.”). 
 132. See Afshari, 392 F.3d at 1040 (“Leaving the determination to the 
Executive Branch, coupled with the procedural protections and judicial review 
afforded by the statute, is both a reasonable and a constitutional way to make a 
determination of whether a group is a ‘foreign terrorist organization.’”); People’s 
Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1242 (stating there are “due process 
standards that the Secretary must meet in making designations” under the 
AEDPA); Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164 (“Treasury provided HLF with the 
requisite notice and opportunity for response necessary to satisfy due process 
requirements.”). 
 133. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“[E]ven the 
unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary’s 
determination” under AEDPA); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of 
State, 251 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“We have, as the statute mandates, 
reviewed the administrative record . . . . We conclude that the Secretary’s 
designation of the National Council of Resistance as an alias for the PMOI does 
not lack substantial support . . . .”). 
 134. Supra Part II.F.  
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Many of the statements of deference that have been made in the 
realm of combating terrorism similarly are understandable and 
justifiable, but the degree of deference over time has reached a 
disturbing level.  
The difference is that the courts have refused to apply law 
that is applicable, have refused even to ask whether there is law to 
be applied, and in some instances have at least implied (if not 
outright stated) that law can be sublimated to the goal of 
security.135 When deference turns to obsequiousness, the judiciary 
has forfeited its role of independent judicial review. This point 
essentially is the flip side of Justice Jackson’s famous dissent in 
Korematsu v. United States136: “If the people ever let command of 
the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the 
courts wield no power equal to its restraint.”137 
Now instead of the people ceding power to the President, we 
have seen the courts ceding power to the President, which may 
require that “We the People” reclaim those powers. 
B. The Detention Cases 
1. “Enemy Combatant” and Guantanamo Detentions 
Yaser Hamdi was one of two U.S. citizens to appear before the 
Supreme Court in 2004.138 He was picked up in Afghanistan by 
                                                                                                     
 135. For an example of this, see Judge Wilkinson’s comments with regard to 
an extrajudicial domestic detention far removed from any realistic notion of a 
“battlefield”: 
For courts to resist this political attempt to meet these rising dangers 
risks making the judiciary the most dangerous branch . . . . The 
advance and democratization of technology proceeds apace, and our 
legal system must show some recognition of these changing 
circumstances. In other words, law must reflect the actual nature of 
modern warfare. 
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring and dissenting), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). This case is discussed further below. Infra Part 
IV.C.2. 
 136. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 137. Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 138. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (“This case arises out 
of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up arms with the 
Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi.”). 
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Northern Alliance forces around the same time and area as John 
Walker Lindh.139 While Lindh was taken directly to the Eastern 
District of Virginia (landing at Andrews Air Force Base),140 Hamdi 
was first taken to Guantanamo and then transported to Naval 
Brigs first at Norfolk, Virginia, and then at Charleston, South 
Carolina.141 He was initially held incommunicado, and his father 
filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.142 Although his case 
does not deal with Guantanamo, the subsequent cases dealing 
with that unfortunate locale are more easily understood with an 
initial look at this extrajudicial detention of a citizen by the 
military. 
Initially, the Fourth Circuit granted total deference to the 
Government on the basis that “because it was ‘undisputed that 
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign 
theater of conflict,’ no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing 
allowing Hamdi to be heard or rebut the Government’s assertions 
was necessary or proper.”143 To this, the Supreme Court 
responded: 
First, the Government urges the adoption of the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding below—that because it is “undisputed” that 
Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone, the habeas 
determination can be made purely as a matter of law, with no 
further hearing or factfinding necessary. This argument is 
easily rejected. . . . [T]he circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s 
seizure cannot in any way be characterized as “undisputed,” as 
“those circumstances are neither conceded in fact, nor 
susceptible to concession in law, because Hamdi has not been 
permitted to speak for himself or even through counsel as to 
those circumstances.”144 
The more serious claim for deference came out of the 
language of “war” that the Government adopted to cover all 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id.; United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 140. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 
 141. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
 142. Id. at 511.  
 143. Id. at 514 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 
2003)). 
 144. Id. at 526 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir. 
2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting)).  
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instances of detention for alleged collaborators with hostile 
groups: 
The Government’s second argument requires closer 
consideration. This is the argument that further factual 
exploration is unwarranted and inappropriate in light of the 
extraordinary constitutional interests at stake. Under the 
Government’s most extreme rendition of this argument, 
“[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited 
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military 
decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict” ought 
to eliminate entirely any individual process, restricting the 
courts to investigating only whether legal authorization exists 
for the broader detention scheme. At most, the Government 
argues, courts should review its determination that a citizen is 
an enemy combatant under a very deferential “some evidence” 
standard. . . . 
 In response, Hamdi emphasizes that this Court 
consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his 
detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without 
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to 
determine whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for 
that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law. He 
argues that the Fourth Circuit inappropriately “ceded power to 
the Executive during wartime to define the conduct for which 
a citizen may be detained, judge whether that citizen has 
engaged in the proscribed conduct, and imprison that citizen 
indefinitely,” and that due process demands that he receive a 
hearing in which he may challenge the [government’s 
conclusions] and adduce his own counterevidence.145 
Conceding that “[b]oth of these positions highlight legitimate 
concerns,” the O’Connor plurality then proceeded to balance the 
competing interests.146 In doing so, it concluded that Hamdi was 
not entitled to the full procedural protections of a criminal 
proceeding because of “the weighty and sensitive governmental 
interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the 
enemy during a war do not return to battle.”147 The plurality went 
along with the Government’s assertions that “burdens” on 
military officials could be “properly taken into account”148—those 
                                                                                                     
 145. Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. at 531. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 532. 
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burdens consisting of distraction to commanders in the field and 
the prospect that “discovery into military operations would both 
intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in 
a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war.”149  
Giving deference to these concerns of the military, balanced 
against the interests of freedom for Hamdi, the plurality came up 
with a hybrid sort of due process holding: 
We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge 
his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice 
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity 
to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker. . . . 
 At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances 
may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-
combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of 
ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to 
be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the 
Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution 
would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the 
Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained 
a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were 
provided.150 
An observer might consider this holding a victory for due 
process and judicial review, but wait: there were two Justices 
who believed that the legislature had not authorized nonjudicial 
Executive detention of a citizen on U.S. soil.151 And in what has to 
be one of the oddest pairings in Supreme Court history, Justices 
Scalia and Stevens dissented sharply on the basis of British 
history known to the Founders, as “due process” in that context 
meant that a citizen accused of criminal conduct was entitled to 
the full procedural panoplies of a criminal trial.152 So there were 
actually four votes for immediate remanding of Hamdi to the civil 
authorities for trial along with the four votes of the plurality for 
habeas corpus review. 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 533–34 (citations omitted). 
 151. See id. at 542–54 (Ginsburg and Souter, J.J., concurring) (arguing that 
the Non-Detention Act did not authorize Hamdi’s detention). 
 152. See id. at 555–58 (describing the evolution of due process, and also the 
writ of habeas corpus as a remedy originating in Renaissance England). 
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So why the diluted form of due process endorsed by the 
plurality rather than the rigorous version of due process endorsed 
by the other four? The answer lies in the procedures of the Court: 
if left to a 4–4 vote, the Court would have to affirm the lower 
court by a divided vote.153 That would have left the Fourth 
Circuit’s total deferential approach in place and left Hamdi with 
no remedy whatsoever. Therefore, Justice Souter joined by 
Justice Ginsburg reluctantly voted with the plurality to “remand 
on terms closest to those I would impose.”154 
The companion case to Hamdi that deals with Guantanamo 
detainees is Rasul v. Bush.155 This time, Justice Stevens was able 
to command a majority of the Court (minus Justice Scalia) to the 
view that the Guantanamo detainees were entitled to proceed in 
federal court under habeas corpus.156 The crux of the matter was 
that Guantanamo is essentially U.S. territory and prisoners on 
our soil are entitled to some form of due process.157 The most 
significant case to be distinguished was a World War II case, 
Johnson v. Eisentrager,158 in which German soldiers were denied 
access to habeas corpus following their trial and imprisonment in 
Germany.159 According to the Court in Rasul:  
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees 
in important respects: They are not nationals of countries at 
war with the United States, and they deny that they have 
                                                                                                     
 153. See H. Ron Davidson, The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching, 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17, 19–20 (2004) (noting that, in the event of a 4–4 tie 
between Justices, the affirmation default rule applies and the court confirms the 
lower court’s ruling in a per curiam opinion). 
 154. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553 (2004). 
 155. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 156. Id. at 481–84 (“Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at 
the base is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. . . . 
We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear 
petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”). 
 157. See id. at 480–81 (explaining that the United States has jurisdiction 
over Guantanamo and arguing aliens held in federal custody, like American 
citizens, are entitled to invoke the habeas statue). 
 158. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 159. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (finding that “a Federal District Court 
lacked authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to 21 German citizens who had 
been captured by U.S. forces in China, tried and Convicted of war crimes, . . . 
and incarcerated in the Landsberg Prison in occupied Germany”). 
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engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United 
States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, 
much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for 
more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory 
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction 
and control.160 
Indeed, the language of Eisentrager was sufficiently 
ambiguous that the case could stand for the proposition that the 
German prisoners had received habeas review and been found to 
have received all the due process to which they were entitled. 
In conclusion, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion merely 
stated that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas 
corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees.161 It set out no 
criteria for when detentions would be held invalid.162 In a mere 
footnote, the Court held: 
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged 
neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United 
States, they have been held in Executive detention for more 
than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive 
jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to 
counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—
unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”163 
The third executive detention case in the 2004 set was a 
habeas corpus petition brought on behalf of Jose Padilla, a U.S. 
citizen arrested at O’Hare Airport for allegedly plotting to place a 
“dirty bomb” somewhere in the United States.164 After Hamdi, it 
would seem that Padilla’s case would be a slam dunk because he 
was not anywhere near a “battlefield,” unless one believed the 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 476. 
 161. See id. at 485 (“What is presently at stake is only whether federal 
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially 
indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of 
wrongdoing. Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse . . . and 
remand . . . .”). 
 162. See id. (“Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary 
after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are 
matters that we need not address now.”). 
 163. Id. at 483 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012)). 
 164. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
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politicians who talked as if the whole world were a battlefield.165 
In a masterpiece of ducking, however, the Court decided that his 
habeas petition was brought in the wrong court because it was 
filed by his New York counsel in New York two days after he had 
been transferred to the Navy Brig in South Carolina.166 There, 
Padilla would languish for almost four years in isolation before he 
was finally brought to trial on criminal charges167—more on that 
abuse of the system later. 
The next act in the drama of Guantanamo occurred two years 
later in 2006, when the Court determined that the military 
commissions established to try war crime allegations at 
Guantanamo were improperly constituted under both domestic 
and international law.168 The case that reached the Court 
involved a charge of “conspiracy” against one of Osama bin 
Laden’s former drivers, prompting a ruling that the concept of 
“conspiracy” was not part of the “law of war.”169 The Executive 
plea for deviation from the procedural requirements of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)170 was unpersuasive. 
“Exigency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment and 
use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article I, § 8, and 
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution unless some other part of that 
document authorizes a response to the felt need.”171 
                                                                                                     
 165. A wide-ranging critique of this notion shows that it did not end with the 
Bush Administration but has continued under President Obama. See Indefinite 
Detention: The World Is Not a Battlefield, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/theworldisnotabattlefield/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2014) (noting that the Obama administration “has also claimed the 
authority to hold terrorism suspects in indefinite military detention”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Law Review). 
 166. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441. 
 167. Judge Agrees Padilla Terror Case ‘Light on Facts,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
June 21, 2006, www.nbcnews.com/id/13462968/#.61JeBBaW2k (last updated 
June 21, 2006, 2:26 PM) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 168. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006) (deciding that the 
President’s military commission lacked the power to try Hamdan and that the 
procedures the Government decreed would govern Hamdan’s trial by 
commission violate the UCMJ and American common law of war). 
 169. Id. at 567 (summarizing Hamdan’s argument that trial by military 
commission for conspiracy is improper as conspiracy is not a violation of the law 
of war). 
 170. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830–854 (2012). 
 171. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted). 
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The Government argued that military necessity mandated 
the need for a military commission with unusual authority, such 
as the ability to allow hearsay evidence and the ability to 
determine inadequate independence of counsel.172 The UCMJ 
provided Congressional authority for military commissions so 
long as the commission procedures were “the same as those 
applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves 
impracticable.”173 The Government urged several aspects of 
deference to the Executive determination that the military 
commissions could dispense with procedural safeguards: 
Finally, the President’s determination that “the danger to the 
safety of the United States and the nature of international 
terrorism” renders it impracticable “to apply in military 
commissions . . . the principles of law and the rules of evidence 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States district courts,” is, in the Government’s view, 
explanation enough for any deviation from court-martial 
procedures.174 
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens responded to this 
argument with mere disbelief: 
Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be 
impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case. There 
is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in 
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in 
applying the usual principles of relevance and 
admissibility. . . . [T]he only reason offered in support of that 
determination is the danger posed by international terrorism. 
Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not 
evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s 
trial, any variance from the rules that govern courts-martial.  
 The absence of any showing of impracticability is 
particularly disturbing when considered in light of the clear 
and admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 622 (describing the Government’s arguments that military 
commissions would be of no use if they were “hamstrung” by the provisions of 
the UCMJ that govern courts-martial and that the nature of terrorism renders 
impracticable the procedures and evidentiary rules used in U.S. criminal cases). 
 173. Id. at 620. 
 174. Id. at 622 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 43–47, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875). 
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protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial 
but also by the UCMJ itself: the right to be present.175 
These comments are probably the high-water mark of judicial 
resistance to demands for deference in relationship to terrorism. 
After this decision, Congress adopted the Military Commission 
Act of 2006 (MCA),176 in which it not only defined a complete 
catalog of offenses against the “law of nations,” but also 
attempted to validate some of the procedural objections to the 
commissions.177 The list of offenses included both “conspiracy” 
and “material support” of terrorism and terrorist organizations.178 
Hamdan was then tried and acquitted of the conspiracy charge 
but found guilty of material support.179 He was sentenced to 
sixty-six months in prison but had already served sixty-one.180 By 
the time a deal was negotiated for repatriation to his native 
Yemen, his sentence had only one month left to run, which he 
served back home and is now free.181 The final twist in this 
bizarre scenario is that the D.C. Circuit ultimately reversed his 
conviction for material support on the ground that it was not a 
crime under either domestic or international law at the time he 
was active with al Qaeda.182 
The third step in the Supreme Court’s handling of 
Guantanamo cases is Boumediene v. Bush,183 which provides a 
                                                                                                     
 175. Id. at 623–24 (footnotes omitted). 
 176. Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2012)). 
 177. See id. § 948(b)–(d) (2012) (establishing the general purpose and 
authority of military commissions as well as their jurisdiction and persons 
subject to them). 
 178. Id. § 950(t). 
 179. William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1. 
 180. Charlie Savage, In Setback for Military Tribunal, Bin Laden Driver’s 
Conviction is Reversed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at A22. 
 181. Robert Worth, Bin Laden Driver to Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
26, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/washington/26gitmo.html?ref=world 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 182. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding 
that because the Military Commission Act cannot be applied ex post facto to 
Hamdan’s actions, and because his actions were not otherwise illegal when 
committed, he could not be found guilty). 
 183. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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measure of judicial review over the Guantanamo detainees,184 but 
also provides the low-water mark for judicial independence in the 
form of Justice Scalia’s most injudicious dissent.185 Justice 
Kennedy, not surprisingly after his concurring opinion in 
Hamdan, wrote the majority for the Court in reviewing the 
validity of the MCA:  
Petitioners present a question not resolved by our earlier cases 
relating to the detention of aliens at Guantanamo: whether 
they have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a 
privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the 
Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. We hold these petitioners 
do have the habeas corpus privilege. Congress has enacted a 
statute, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), that 
provides certain procedures for review of the detainees’ status. 
We hold that those procedures are not an adequate and 
effective substitute for habeas corpus. Therefore § 7 of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) operates as an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ. We do not address 
whether the President has authority to detain these 
petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and 
other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to 
be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.186 
Justice Kennedy provided this insight into why judicial 
review, as opposed to the careful and informed review by military 
experts, is crucial to sustained detention: 
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, 
say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for 
collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the 
usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal 
disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures 
designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are 
not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review 
procedures.187 
                                                                                                     
 184. See id. at 771 (holding “Art. 1, §9, cl.2 of the Constitutions has full 
effect at Guantanamo Bay[,]” and therefore, prisoners there are entitled to 
habeas review). 
 185. Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 732 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
 187. Id. at 783. 
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Finally, Justice Kennedy had some comments regarding the 
relative roles of executive and judiciary in dealing with public 
safety: 
In considering both the procedural and substantive standards 
used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper 
deference must be accorded to the political branches. Unlike 
the President and some designated Members of Congress, 
neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges 
begin the day with briefings that may describe new and 
serious threats to our Nation and its people. The law must 
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and 
detain those who pose a real danger to our security. 
 Officials charged with daily operational responsibility for 
our security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far 
removed from the Nation’s present, urgent concerns. 
Established legal doctrine, however, must be consulted for its 
teaching. Remote in time it may be; irrelevant to the present it 
is not. Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence 
apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to 
interdict. There are further considerations, however. Security 
subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief 
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful 
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence 
to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the 
judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief 
derives.188 
Justice Scalia provided for a low point of judicial 
temperament and independence when he engaged in a highly 
inflammatory and disrespectful tirade against the majority: 
America is at war with radical Islamists. The enemy began by 
killing Americans and American allies abroad: 241 at the 
Marine barracks in Lebanon, 19 at the Khobar Towers in 
Dhahran, 224 at our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, 
and 17 on the USS Cole in Yemen. On September 11, 2001, the 
enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the 
Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., and 40 in Pennsylvania. 
 The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays 
upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war 
                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 728–29. 
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harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to 
be killed. . . .  
 In the short term . . . the decision is devastating. At least 
30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo Bay 
have returned to the battlefield. Some have been captured or 
killed. But others have succeeded in carrying on their 
atrocities against innocent civilians. . . .  
 These, mind you, were detainees whom the military had 
concluded were not enemy combatants. Their return to the kill 
illustrates the incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who 
is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations 
where the environment does not lend itself to rigorous 
evidence collection.189  
The lack of civility in Justice Scalia’s dissent has not been 
much noted in either scholarly or journalistic commentary. 
Accusing his colleagues of “caus[ing] more Americans to be killed” 
is hardly the discourse of persuasion and judicial temperament. 
Even more amazing is the lack of logic in the argument. If the 
military has released dangerous people after deciding that they 
are not enemy combatants, showing the difficulty of predicting 
dangerousness, how does that argue against judicial review over 
the power to imprison someone? What in that argument gives rise 
to an inference of confidence in the ability of anyone to predict 
future dangerousness? 
Following Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit was obligated to 
develop standards for review of the detentions at Guantanamo. 
Here are summaries of some of the D.C. court opinions leading up 
to the question of what criteria should be used for determining 
whether someone is to be detained. 
Hamlily v. Obama.190 The Obama Administration staked out 
its position on Executive detention in a brief filed in March 2009 
in this case. It based the detention authority squarely on the 
AUMF without mentioning inherent Article II powers, and it has 
continued to take that position since.191 It took the position that 
                                                                                                     
 189. Id. at 827–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 190. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 191. See id. at 67 (noting the Government itself states its proposed 
framework is based on the AUMF); see also id. at 66 n.1 (noting the Government 
has dropped its Article II arguments) (citing Respondents’ Memorandum 
regarding the Government’s Detention Authority at 1, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:05cv02378)). 
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detention authority extended to members and substantial 
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces,192 
differing from the Bush Administration only by adding the 
qualifier of “substantial” support for one who cannot be 
considered a “member” of an “associated force.” The subsequent 
cases have attempted to discern what would constitute 
“substantial support” in the case of someone who was not directly 
involved with al Qaeda or the Taliban, but (apart from the 
Uighurs) there has not been anyone brought before the courts 
who had no connection with operations in Afghanistan.193 
Al-Bihani v. Obama.194 Al-Bihani served as a cook in a loose 
affiliation of Taliban and al Qaeda volunteers fighting against the 
Northern Alliance.195 He was captured and handed over to the 
U.S. forces and ultimately sent to Guantanamo.196 The big 
question centered around “whom the President can lawfully 
detain pursuant to statutes passed by Congress. . . . The Supreme 
Court has provided scant guidance . . . , consciously leaving the 
contours of the substantive and procedural law of detention open 
for lower courts to shape in a common law fashion.”197 The D.C. 
Circuit panel in al-Bihani articulated a standard of “an . . . 
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda 
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners.”198  
                                                                                                     
 192. See id. at 70 (describing the Government’s arguments on who could be 
detained) (citing Government’s Response to Petitioners’ Joint Memorandum 
Relating to Detention Authority at 6, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:05cv02378)). 
 193. See e.g., Al Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(holding that the Government met its burden of demonstrating a petitioner had 
been a member of or substantially supported al Qaeda, a determination that is 
made by deciding “whether the individual functions or participates within or 
sunder the command of the organization” (quotation omitted)); Hatim v. Obama, 
677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (deciding that the Government may not 
justify indefinite detention solely by demonstrating someone provided 
substantial or direct support to enemy armed forces).  
 194. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 195. Id. at 869. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 879 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)). 
 198. Id. at 872 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 
2009)). 
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The standard can be satisfied by either of two independent 
components:  
While we think the facts of this case show Al-Bihani was both 
part of and substantially supported enemy forces, we realize 
the picture may be less clear in other cases where facts may 
indicate only support, only membership, or neither. We have 
no occasion here to explore the outer bounds of what 
constitutes sufficient support or indicia of membership to meet 
the detention standard. We merely recognize that both prongs 
are valid criteria that are independently sufficient to satisfy 
the standard.199 
Bensayah v. Obama.200 “Bensayah, an Algerian citizen, was 
arrested by the Bosnian police on immigration charges in late 
2001.”201 He and the five other Algerian men arrested in Bosnia 
were suspected of plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo 
but eventually were released for insufficient evidence.202 The six 
were turned over to the United States and transported to 
Guantanamo in early 2002.203 
The district court granted habeas relief to the other five men 
on the ground that there was no reliable evidence that they had 
intended to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the United 
States.204. The district court, however, denied Bensayah’s petition 
for habeas corpus, holding that the Government had adduced 
sufficient evidence to show it was more likely than not that he 
had “supported” al Qaeda.205 The evidence for this conclusion 
consisted primarily of a classified document plus corroboration 
from a classified source.206 On appeal, the Government disclaimed 
reliance on the source and abandoned the argument that he had 
provided “support” for al Qaeda.207 Instead, it argued that he was 
                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 873–74. 
 200. 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 201. Id. at 720. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 721. 
 205. Id. at 722. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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“part of” al Qaeda.208 The D.C. Circuit panel started with this 
observation: 
Although it is clear al Qaeda has, or at least at one time had, a 
particular organizational structure, the details of its structure 
are generally unknown, but it is thought to be somewhat 
amorphous. As a result, it is impossible to provide an 
exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an 
individual is “part of” al Qaeda. That determination must be 
made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than 
a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the 
individual in relation to the organization. That an individual 
operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely 
sufficient but is not necessary to show he is “part of” the 
organization; there may be other indicia that a particular 
individual is sufficiently involved with the organization to be 
deemed part of it, but the purely independent conduct of a 
freelancer is not enough.209 
The court stated that membership in al Qaeda would be 
enough to justify detention, but the Government must produce 
evidence showing participation in some activity directly 
connected to an associated group.210 Without the asserted 
corroboration for the classified document, the court of appeals 
found there was insufficient evidence to show that he was “part 
of” an organization and remanded for the district court to receive 
any further evidence that the Government might choose to bring 
forward.211 Much of the opinion is redacted so it is impossible to 
know what he did or what the Government did to obtain evidence 
about him. 
Conclusion—Preliminary. The D.C. Circuit has decided that 
the government is entitled to introduce hearsay testimony and 
that testimony is even entitled to a presumption of regularity, not 
exactly a presumption of truthfulness of the statement but that 
the statement was made.212 The burden of proof to show 
detainability remains on the government and the hearsay 
evidence is introduced only for whatever probative value it may 
                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 720. 
 209. Id. at 725 (citations omitted). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 727. 
 212. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (2012) (applying the Hamdi 
rule that hearsay should be admitted as long as petitioner is allowed to rebut it). 
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have, while the detainee is entitled to introduce evidence to rebut 
the government’s position.213 
As of mid-2010, the scorecard was 32–16 in favor of the 
petitioners.214 Since that time, not a single habeas petition has 
been granted.215 Probably, the easy cases were decided early and 
the prisoners released so that the remaining Guantanamo 
detainees mostly have demonstrable ties to al Qaeda or the 
Taliban and thus meet the standards for detention. 
The saga of U.S. involvement with Guantanamo detention is 
long, complicated, and likely to continue for some time. The 
purpose of this exercise has been merely to address the degree of 
deference given by the judiciary to the Executive and Legislative 
branches. It is a mixed story. Although the courts have talked in 
deferential terms and allowed unusual procedures (such as use of 
hearsay evidence), there has been no carte blanche acquiescence 
to all detentions at Guantanamo or to the standards and 
procedures adopted by Congress. That, unfortunately, is not true 
with many of the cases to which we will turn next. 
2. Looking Away from Domestic Executive Detentions 
a. Aliens as a Special Class 
Immediately after 9/11, resident aliens became the primary 
focus of counterterrorism efforts. The majority of the detainees in 
the PENTTBOM216 investigation were aliens who were placed in 
the custody of immigration officials.217 Signed into law on October 
                                                                                                     
 213. See id. (discussing procedural and policy reasons for admitting hearsay 
in military commissions). 
 214. See generally CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GUANTANAMO HABEAS 
SCORECARD (2012), http://ccrjustice.org/files/2012-05-
30%20Updated%20Habeas%20SCORECARD.pdf.  
 215. Id. 
 216. “PENTTBOM” refers to the FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 attacks. U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: 
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
 217. See id. at 3 (explaining that the report focuses on treatment of persons 
detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at “two facilities 
because they held the majority of September 11 detainees”). 
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26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act218 contained a provision 
authorizing the Attorney General to “take into custody” any alien 
he has reasonable grounds to believe is involved in terrorist 
activity and to hold the alien for up to six months in renewable 
increments,219 with no process or evidentiary hearing and subject 
only to judicial review by a habeas corpus petition.220 Apparently, 
however, DOJ did not use this power because it had sufficient 
authority under existing law to hold aliens considered for 
deportation without bond.221  
In 2002, DOJ announced the “National Security Entry–Exit 
Registration System” (NSEERS).222 Among other things, 
NSEERS instituted a “special call-in registration” program that 
required alien males from designated countries (all Muslim-
majority states except for North Korea) to report to immigration 
offices to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed.223 
                                                                                                     
 218. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 219. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) (2012) 
An alien detained [for suspicion of terrorist or espionage activity] and 
whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may 
be detained for additional periods of up to six months only if the 
release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United 
States or the safety of the community or any person. 
 220. See id. § 1226a(b) (“Judicial review of any action or decision relating to 
this section . . . is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings . . . . Except 
as provided in the preceding sentence, no court shall have jurisdiction to review, 
by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any such action or decision.”). 
 221. See The USA Patriot Act: Myth v. Reality, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/add_myths.htm#s412 (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014) 
As of February 2004, the Attorney General had not used section 412. 
Numerous aliens who could have been considered have been detained 
since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. But it has not proven 
necessary to use section 412 in these particular cases because 
traditional administrative bond proceedings have been sufficient to 
detain these individuals without bond. The Department believes that 
this authority should be retained for use in appropriate situations. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 222. Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Implementation of the First Phase 
of the National Security Entry–Exit Registration System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
(Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_ag_466.htm (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 223. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the 
NSEERS program). 
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Those who did not report were threatened with arrest.224 
According to multiple sources, the program registered nearly 
83,000 aliens, more than 13,000 of whom were placed in 
deportation proceedings.225 In a series of cases, the program was 
challenged by aliens whose registration led to deportation 
proceedings, and in each case, the arguments were rejected.226 In 
Rajah v. Mukasey,227 for instance, the Second Circuit found no 
Equal Protection violation: 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were facilitated 
by the lax enforcement of immigration laws. The [Special Call–
In Registration] Program was designed to monitor more 
closely aliens from certain countries selected on the basis of 
national security criteria. The individuals subject to special 
registration under the Program were neither citizens nor even 
lawful permanent residents. They were asked to provide 
information regarding their immigration status and other 
matters relevant to national security. They were not held in 
custody for appreciable lengths of time. Those whose 
immigration status was not valid were subject to generally 
applicable legal proceedings to enforce pre-existing 
immigration laws. In sum, the Program was a plainly rational 
attempt to enhance national security.228  
                                                                                                     
 224. Id.  
 225. Nurth C. Aizenman & Edward Walsh, Immigrants Fear Deportation 
After Registration; Number of Mideast, Muslim Men Expelled Rises Sharply, 
WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at A1. 
 226. See, e.g., Alnahham v. Holder, 371 F. App’x 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding plaintiff “Alnahham had no right to remain silent with respect to [the 
Special Call-In Registration Program’s] requirement that he appear for 
registration, fingerprinting and presentation of immigration-related documents” 
(citation omitted)); Rajah, 544 F.3d at 434–36, 438–443 (finding the Special 
Call-In Registration Program was authorized by statute and not 
unconstitutional); Malik v. Gonzales, 213 F. App’x 173, 174 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that removal proceedings pursuant to NSEERS did not violate 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights and federal courts did not have jurisdiction to 
hear these kinds of claims); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(same); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding immigration 
judge did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights by denying continuance of 
removal proceedings brought after plaintiff’s registration with NSEERS); Zafar 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Shaybob v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 189 F. App’x 127 (3d Cir. 2006) (same). 
 227. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 228. Id. at 438–39 (citations omitted). Although the NSEERS re-registration 
requirement was suspended in December 2003, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT 
SHEET: CHANGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY/EXIT REGISTRATION SYSTEM 
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With mounting complaints about post-9/11 investigations, 
DOJ’s Office of Inspector General undertook a review of the 
detentions and the conditions of confinement of terrorism 
suspects.229 Released in June 2003, the report noted that agents 
investigating leads would arrest all individuals who were out of 
immigration status and treat them as being “of interest” in the 
9/11 investigation, regardless of whether they were connected 
with the lead.230 Moreover, leads resulting in arrests were often 
very “general in nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious 
activity by an Arab tenant.”231 
b. A “Plausible” Claim of Policy 
In December 2003, a supplemental report found evidence of 
verbal and physical abuse of 9/11 detainees at the Metropolitan 
Detention Center (MDC) in New York City.232 Although it did not 
find that detainees had been brutally beaten, “some officers 
slammed detainees against the wall, twisted their arms and 
hands in painful ways, stepped on their leg restraint chains, and 
punished them by keeping them restrained for long periods of 
time.”233 A number of lawsuits were filed by MDC detainees, 
including one by Javad Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim arrested on 
criminal charges and detained in restrictive conditions as a 
                                                                                                     
(NSEERS) 1 (2003), the NSEERS program itself continued until 2011. See DHS 
Removes Designated Countries from NSEERS Registration (May 2011), U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-removes-designated-
countries-nseers-registration-may-2011 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (noting that 
the Department was “effectively ending the NSEERS registration process 
through the publication of a notice in the Federal Register”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 229. OIG REPORT, supra note 216, at 2–3. 
 230. See id. at 16 (providing an example of how law enforcement officials in 
New York followed such a process). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATION OF ABUSE AT 
THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 47 (2003) (“[W]e 
believe that the evidence developed in our investigation shows physical and 
verbal abuse of some detainees by some MDC staff members.”). 
 233. Id. at 46. 
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person of “high interest” in the 9/11 investigation.234 After 
pleading guilty, serving a term of imprisonment, and being 
deported to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a Bivens235 action against federal 
officials “rang[ing] from the correctional officers who had day-to-
day contact with respondent during the term of his 
confinement, . . . all the way to petitioners—officials who were at 
the highest level of the federal law enforcement hierarchy.”236 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,237 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
complaint against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller failed to plead sufficient facts to state a 
claim for relief.238 The Court rejected out of hand the allegations 
that Ashcroft and Mueller countenanced harsh treatment of 
detainees based on their religion, race, and national origin, 
holding that “[t]hese bare assertions . . . amount to nothing more 
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
discrimination claim.”239 It also found that Iqbal failed to make a 
plausible showing that Ashcroft and Mueller purposefully 
adopted a policy of invidious discrimination in classifying 9/11 
detainees as being “high interest”: 
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab 
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good 
standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al 
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin 
Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim 
disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy 
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a 
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though 
                                                                                                     
 234. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2009) (“Iqbal is a citizen of 
Pakistan and a Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal charges and detained 
by federal officials. . . . [Iqbal] was designated a person ‘of high interest’ to the 
September 11 investigation . . . .”). 
 235. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). Bivens recognizes a cause of action for monetary damages by an 
individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by federal officials. Id. 
at 391–97. 
 236. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668 (citation omitted). 
 237. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 238. Id. at 687. 
 239. Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)). 
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the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor 
Muslims.240  
To allow this suit to go forward, the Court concluded, would 
divert the attention of those officials charged with responding to 
“a national and international security emergency unprecedented 
in the history of the American republic.”241 After Iqbal, the 
Second Circuit partially reversed the dismissal of another suit by 
MDC detainees, allowing them the opportunity to meet the 
Supreme Court’s pleading standard with regard to claims related 
to the conditions of confinement.242 
c. Material Witness Warrants 
Another basis for detaining persons is the material witness 
warrant. Material witness warrants are issued by a judge or 
magistrate under conditions similar to an arrest warrant, but 
their purpose is to secure a person’s testimony rather than to 
hold him for trial.243 Before issuing a warrant, a court will require 
probable cause to believe that the person’s testimony is material 
and that it may be impracticable to secure the person’s presence 
by subpoena.244  
In the post-9/11 atmosphere, material witness warrants were 
used to secure a number of people who were thought to be 
                                                                                                     
 240. Id. at 682. 
 241. Id. at 685 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Cabranes, J., concurring)). 
 242. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546–47 (2d Cir. 2009) (deciding 
to “vacate that portion of the district court’s order denying dismissal of the 
conditions of confinement claims on the ground that an outdated pleading 
standard was applied, and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with the standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal”). Five of the detainees 
subsequently reached a $1.26 million settlement with the Government. Five 
New York Men Detained and Abused in Post-9/11 Immigration Sweeps Settle 
Case for $1.26 Million, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/five-new-york-men-detained-and-
abused-post-9/11-immigration-sweeps-settle-ca (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (“If it appears from an affidavit filed by a 
party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if 
it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the 
person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person . . . .”). 
 244. Id.  
354 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) 
plotters but as to whom there was not probable cause for arrest. 
Their alleged plotting was said to be the basis for thinking they 
would have material evidence for a grand jury, but this sounded 
like a subterfuge to many observers, who claimed the warrants 
were being used in lieu of preventive custody, a practice clearly 
prohibited by due process. 
For example, alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla was 
arrested under a material witness warrant and held for a month 
before he was transferred to military custody as an enemy 
combatant.245 In 2004, Brandon Mayfield was arrested and held 
for two weeks as a material witness based on incorrect evidence 
connecting him to the Madrid train bombings.246 Subsequent to 
his release, Mayfield received an apology from the FBI and a $2 
million settlement from the U.S. government.247 
Not surprisingly, the use of material witness warrants 
suspected to be subterfuge for preventive custody was challenged 
in several terrorism-related cases. In United States v. 
Awadallah,248 Osama Awadallah was taken into custody in Los 
Angeles after his name and phone number were found on a gum 
wrapper in the car of one of the 9/11 hijackers.249 Awadallah was 
detained on a material witness warrant and flown to New York, 
where he testified twice before a grand jury over the course of 
several days.250 He admitted having met two of the hijackers and 
described their physical appearances.251 Initially, he claimed to 
know the name of only one and not the other, but during his 
second appearance he conceded he thought he knew the name of 
the other hijacker.252 Charged with perjury, Awadallah moved to 
                                                                                                     
 245. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part 
IV.C.1 (discussing Padilla).   
 246. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2010); see 
also infra notes 411–23 and accompanying text (discussing Mayfield).  
 247. Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 968. 
 248. 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
 249. Id. at 58. 
 250. Id. at 58–59. 
 251. Id.  
 252. See id. at 59  
Awadallah immediately denied writing the name “Khalid” in the 
booklet. However, five days later, when he again testified before the 
grand jury, Awadallah testified that he had written the word “Khalid” 
When asked if he ‘recalled any part of this man’s name,’ Awadallah 
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suppress his grand jury statement253 and dismiss the indictment 
for abuse of the material witness statute.254 The district judge 
agreed: “[S]ince 1789, no Congress has granted the government 
the authority to imprison an innocent person in order to 
guarantee that he will testify before a grand jury conducting a 
criminal investigation.”255 The Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that obtaining grand jury testimony would be an appropriate use 
of the material witness statute: 
The district court noted (and we agree) that it would be 
improper for the government to use § 3144 for other ends, such 
as the detention of persons suspected of criminal activity for 
which probable cause has not yet been established. However, 
the district court made no finding (and we see no evidence to 
suggest) that the government arrested Awadallah for any 
purpose other than to secure information material to a grand 
jury investigation. Moreover, that grand jury was 
investigating the September 11 terrorist attacks. The 
particular governmental interests at stake therefore were the 
indictment and successful prosecution of terrorists whose 
attack, if committed by a sovereign, would have been 
tantamount to war, and the discovery of the conspirators’ 
means, contacts, and operations in order to forestall future 
attacks.256 
Another case eventually made it to the Supreme Court.257 In 
2005, Abdullah al-Kidd, an African-American Muslim, brought a 
suit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, claiming 
that he had been illegally arrested and confined under the federal 
                                                                                                     
testified that he thought that the “man’s name was Khalid.” 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id. at 61. 
 255. Id. at 82 (citation omitted).  
 256. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Material Witness Det., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 
1268–69 (D. Or. 2003) (finding that a grand jury proceeding is a “criminal 
proceeding” as used in the material witness statute and thus a witness could be 
detained under the statute for grand jury proceedings); In re Application of 
United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289–300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to follow the district court’s approach in Awadallah 
and ruling that grand jury proceedings are “criminal proceedings” for the 
purposes of the material witness statute). 
 257. The Supreme Court denied Awadallah’s petition for certiorari. 
Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056, 1056 (2005). 
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material witness statute.258 As summarized by the appellate 
court, 
[Al-Kidd] was arrested at a Dulles International Airport ticket 
counter. He was handcuffed, taken to the airport’s police 
substation, and interrogated. Over the next sixteen days, he 
was confined in high security cells lit twenty-four hours a day 
in Virginia, Oklahoma, and then Idaho, during which he was 
strip searched on multiple occasions. Each time he was 
transferred to a different facility, al-Kidd was handcuffed and 
shackled about his wrists, legs, and waist. He was eventually 
released from custody by court order, on the conditions that he 
live with his wife and in-laws in Nevada, limit his travel to 
Nevada and three other states, surrender his travel 
documents, regularly report to a probation officer, and consent 
to home visits throughout the period of supervision. By the 
time al-Kidd’s confinement and supervision ended, fifteen 
months after his arrest, al-Kidd had been fired from his job as 
an employee of a government contractor because he was 
denied a security clearance due to his arrest, and had 
separated from his wife. He has been unable to obtain steady 
employment since his arrest.259 
According to al-Kidd, his mistreatment was the result of a 
program devised by Ashcroft and other government officials, as 
evidenced by a number of DOJ statements publicly extolling the 
utility of the procedure.260 
In Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,261 a unanimous Supreme Court held 
that the former Attorney General enjoyed qualified immunity 
given the lack of clearly established law.262 Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion went further by holding that “an objectively 
reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to 
a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as 
unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting 
                                                                                                     
 258. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 259. Id. at 951–52. 
 260. See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (Smith, J., 
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that various statements made 
by DOJ officials supported the notion that “Ashcroft and others operating at his 
direction, or in concert with him, had decided to undertake a novel use of . . . the 
material witness statute”). 
 261. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).  
 262. Id. at 2085–86. 
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authority had an improper motive.”263 Four concurring Justices 
reiterated that the Court left unresolved questions it need not 
reach to decide the case: whether the material witness warrant 
was necessary to secure al-Kidd’s testimony and, more generally, 
whether the material witness statute comports with the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Clause.264 Concurring Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor also objected to the majority’s apparent 
disposition of the merits of al-Kidd’s claim: 
In addressing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim against 
Ashcroft, the Court assumes at the outset the existence of a 
validly obtained material witness warrant. That 
characterization is puzzling. Is a warrant “validly obtained” 
when the affidavit on which it is based fails to inform the 
issuing Magistrate Judge that “the Government has no 
intention of using [al-Kidd as a witness] at [another’s] trial,” 
and does not disclose that al-Kidd had cooperated with FBI 
agents each of the several times they had asked to interview 
him? 
 Casting further doubt on the assumption that the 
warrant was validly obtained, the Magistrate Judge was not 
told that al-Kidd’s parents, wife, and children were all citizens 
and residents of the United States. In addition, the affidavit 
misrepresented that al-Kidd was about to take a one-way 
flight to Saudi Arabia, with a first-class ticket costing 
approximately $5,000; in fact, al-Kidd had a round-trip, coach-
class ticket that cost $1,700. Given these omissions and 
misrepresentations, there is strong cause to question the 
Court’s opening assumption—a valid material-witness 
warrant—and equally strong reason to conclude that a merits 
determination was neither necessary nor proper.265  
                                                                                                     
 263. Id. at 2085.  
 264. See id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (“Given the difficulty of these issues, the Court is 
correct to address only the legal theory [of qualified immunity] put before it, 
without further exploring when material witness arrests might be consistent 
with statutory and constitutional requirements.”). 
 265. Id. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Breyer and 
Sotomayor, JJ.) (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence also balked at the majority opinion’s statement that al-Kidd’s arrest 
was “based on individualized suspicion”:  
The word “suspicion,” however, ordinarily indicates that the person 
suspected has engaged in wrongdoing. Material witness status does 
not “involv[e] suspicion, or lack of suspicion,” of the individual so 
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C. Domestic “Enemy Combatants” 
1. The Odyssey of Jose Padilla 
The Government aptly demonstrated its near-contempt for 
judicial independence during the “rendition” of Jose Padilla for 
trial when his lawyers filed a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court on his habeas corpus claim after he had spent 
almost four years in solitary confinement without judicial 
review.266  
Padilla was arrested arriving at O’Hare Airport after flying 
from Pakistan, where he allegedly trained in bombing 
techniques.267 He was held initially as a material witness in New 
York, then two days before his court-appointed counsel could file 
                                                                                                     
identified. 
  This Court’s decisions, until today, have uniformly used the term 
“individualized suspicion” to mean “individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.” 
  The Court’s suggestion that the term “individualized suspicion” is 
more commonly associated with “know[ing] something about [a] 
crime” or “throwing . . . a surprise birthday party” than with criminal 
suspects, is hardly credible. The import of the term in legal argot is 
not genuinely debatable. When the evening news reports that a 
murder “suspect” is on the loose, the viewer is meant to be on the 
lookout for the perpetrator, not the witness. Ashcroft understood the 
term as lawyers commonly do: He spoke of detaining material 
witnesses as a means to “tak[e] suspected terrorists off the street.” 
Id. at 2088 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 266. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084 (2006) (explaining that 
Padilla wished to have the Court “consider his release [from military custody] 
along with his petition for certiorari,” as opposed to the Government 
transferring him while his petition was still pending). Chief Justice Roberts 
granted the transfer and noted: “[t]he Court will consider the pending petition 
for certiorari in due course.” Id. 
 267. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423 
F.3d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (“On May 8, 2002, Padilla 
flew from Pakistan to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. As he stepped off 
the plane, Padilla was apprehended by federal agents . . . .”); Donna Leinwand 
& Jack Kelly, U.S. Citizen Arrested in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot, USA TODAY (June 11, 
2002, 11:28 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/06/10/terror-arrest.htm (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (reporting that, prior to entering the United States, Padilla 
had “traveled to Pakistan, where he studied how to assemble a radioactive 
bomb,” according to a senior U.S. law enforcement official) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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for habeas corpus in New York, he was transferred to a Naval 
Brig in South Carolina as an enemy combatant.268 The 
Government’s public statements asserted that he was planning to 
detonate a “dirty bomb” that would spread radioactive material 
across a major city.269 
His lawyers refiled his habeas petition in South Carolina and 
the district court granted the petition, holding that the AUMF did 
not grant authority to the President to hold a citizen arrested on 
U.S. soil for a crime yet to be committed.270 The Fourth Circuit 
then accepted the Government’s reframed assertions: 
Padilla met with al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, received 
explosives training in an al Qaeda-affiliated camp, and served 
as an armed guard at what he understood to be a Taliban 
outpost. When United States military operations began in 
Afghanistan, Padilla and other al Qaeda operatives moved 
from safehouse to safehouse to evade bombing or capture. 
Padilla was, on the facts with which we are presented, “armed 
and present in a combat zone during armed conflict between al 
Qaeda/Taliban forces and the armed forces of the United 
States.” 
 . . . Once in Pakistan, Padilla met with Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammad, a senior al Qaeda operations planner, who 
directed Padilla to travel to the United States for the purpose 
of blowing up apartment buildings, in continued prosecution of 
al Qaeda’s war of terror against the United States. After 
receiving further training, as well as cash, travel documents, 
and communication devices, Padilla flew to the United States 
in order to carry out his accepted assignment.271 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“On June 9, 2002, the [New York] 
district court vacated the material witness warrant and petitioner was 
transferred to military control. . . . On June 11, Padilla’s counsel, claiming to act 
as his next friend, filed in the Southern District [of New York] a habeas corpus 
petition . . . .”). 
 269. See Leinwand & Kelly, supra note 267 (“The dirty bomb plot was in its 
initial stages and did not have a target, although [Padilla] has ‘indicated some 
knowledge of the Washington, D.C., area,’ Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz said Monday. Intelligence sources said Chicago also might have been 
a potential target.”). 
 270. See Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689–91 (rejecting the Government’s 
position that either Padilla’s detention was explicitly authorized by Congress or 
that the President possessed inherent power to order such a detention). 
 271. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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On this version of the facts, the court held that his carrying 
of arms in Afghanistan made him an “enemy combatant” 
appropriate for detention under the AUMF.272 The Fourth Circuit 
held that Padilla was an “enemy belligerent” who “associated 
with the military arm of the enemy, and with its aid, guidance, 
and direction entered this country bent on committing hostile 
acts on American soil.”273 But these “facts” were based on a 
stipulation by the petitioner’s counsel for purposes of a summary 
judgment motion—they were never subjected to a neutral 
factfinder’s review274—and the claim that he entered the country 
to explode a “dirty bomb” was dropped in favor of a variety of 
modified contentions in different venues.275 
The petition for certiorari was presented to the Supreme 
Court on October 25, 2005.276 Just before its response to the 
petition was due at the Supreme Court, the Government filed a 
motion to transfer him to civilian custody in Florida to stand trial 
on various charges.277 That motion was referred by the Fourth 
Circuit to the Supreme Court, which granted it on January 4, 
2006.278 The Court asserted that it would “consider the pending 
petition for certiorari in due course,”279 which it did with a very 
unusual set of opinions in April 2006. The petition was denied 
                                                                                                     
 272. Id. at 391. 
 273. Id. at 392 (citation omitted). 
 274. See id. at 390 n.1 (“For purposes of Padilla’s summary judgment 
motion, the parties have stipulated to the facts as set forth by the government. 
It is only on these facts that we consider whether the President has the 
authority to detain Padilla.” (citation omitted)). Because the Fourth Circuit 
granted the Government summary judgment on these facts, id. at 397, and the 
Supreme Court subsequently denied Padilla’s petition for certiorari, Padilla v. 
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006), the Government was never required to prove 
its facts at trial. 
 275. Infra notes 277–83 and accompanying text. 
 276. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 
(2006) (No. 05-533).  
 277. See Padilla v. Hanft, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (“On November 22, 2005, the 
Government filed a motion before the Fourth Circuit, seeking approval to 
transfer Padilla from military custody to the custody of the warden of a federal 
detention center in Florida, to face criminal charges contained in an indictment 
filed November 17, 2005.” (citation omitted)). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
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over three dissents with a concurring opinion by three Justices.280 
Justice Kennedy, for the three concurring Justices, wrote: 
In light of the previous changes in his custody status and the 
fact that nearly four years have passed since he first was 
detained, Padilla, it must be acknowledged, has a continuing 
concern that his status might be altered again. That concern, 
however, can be addressed if the necessity arises. . . . 
 That Padilla’s claims raise fundamental issues respecting 
the separation of powers, including consideration of the role 
and function of the courts, also counsels against addressing 
those claims when the course of legal proceedings has made 
them, at least for now, hypothetical. This is especially true 
given that Padilla’s current custody is part of the relief he 
sought, and that its lawfulness is uncontested.281 
Ironically, it could just as easily be argued that the 
“separation of powers, including consideration of the role and 
function of the courts,” weighed heavily against allowing the 
government to play fast and loose with the system by transferring 
him once again to a different jurisdiction for a different purpose, 
thus avoiding judicial review of his four-year-long detention. 
Justice Ginsburg was quite restrained in her dissent from the 
denial of certiorari, addressing merely the issue of whether the 
petition was moot.282 
All this came after Padilla’s application for habeas relief was 
kicked from New York to South Carolina, granted by the district 
court, and denied by the Fourth Circuit, by which time he had 
been held in solitary confinement with no judicial review for 
nearly four years. How can this be considered to be in compliance 
with our own due process clause, let alone with any number of 
international human rights provisions? It also illustrates the 
near contempt with which the Administration tended to treat the 
                                                                                                     
 280. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter voted to grant certiorari, but 
only Justice Ginsburg wrote separately. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062–
64 (2006). Justice Kennedy concurred in the denial of certiorari, writing on 
behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Stevens. Id. 
 281. Id. at 1063–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Stevens, J.). 
 282. See id. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) 
(noting that the Government’s “voluntary cessation [of reliance on purported 
Executive authority] does not make [the] case less capable of repetition or less 
evasive of review” (citation omitted)). 
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Judiciary—deciding not to give the Supreme Court a chance at an 
obvious violation of law. 
Following these shenanigans, Padilla eventually was tried 
and convicted on charges for conspiring to commit murder 
outside the United States and conspiring to provide material 
support to terrorism.283 He was sentenced to seventeen years in 
prison284 and then brought a civil action for damages against 
John Yoo,285 among others in California, while his mother 
brought a similar action in Virginia.286 Both actions sought 
damages for wrongful confinement as well as mistreatment while 
in custody.287 These will be considered in the section below on 
“Damage Actions Against Government Officials,”288 but suffice to 
say at this point the courts have ducked those actions as well. 
2. The Iliad of Ali al-Marri 
Just as the Greek Iliad tells a very elaborate tale but 
purports to cover only a few weeks in a protracted war, the case 
of Ali al-Marri speaks volumes in the context of a single person’s 
treatment at the hands of our government. Judge Motz’s opening 
paragraph of her concurring opinion in the Fourth Circuit en 
banc proceeding is worth quoting in full: 
                                                                                                     
 283. Peter Whoriskey, Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of Terror Charges, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/08/16/AR2007081601009.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The charges were actually a touch 
more complicated than that, and raise some substantial issues of the propriety 
of conspiracy law, but that is a subject for another day. See United States v. 
Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE/Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85720, at 
*10–13 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (rejecting the various arguments of Padilla and 
other defendants that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the 
substantive law). 
 284. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years, 
Cites His Detention, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012200565.html 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 285. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 286. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 546–47 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 287. Padilla, 678 F.3d 751–52; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 546. 
 288. Infra notes 364–73 and accompanying text. 
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For over two centuries of growth and struggle, peace and war, 
the Constitution has secured our freedom through the 
guarantee that, in the United States, no one will be deprived 
of liberty without due process of law. Yet more than five years 
ago, military authorities seized Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, an 
alien lawfully residing here. He has been held by the military 
ever since—without criminal charge or process. He has been so 
held, despite the fact that he was initially taken from his home 
in Peoria, Illinois, by civilian authorities and imprisoned 
awaiting trial for purported domestic crimes. He has been so 
held, although the Government has never alleged that he is a 
member of any nation’s military, has fought alongside any 
nation’s armed forces, or has borne arms against the United 
States anywhere in the world. And he has been so held, 
without acknowledgment of the protection afforded by the 
Constitution, solely because the Executive believes that his 
indefinite military detention—or even the indefinite military 
detention of a similarly situated American citizen—is 
proper.289 
Ali al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, entered the United States on 
September 10, 2001, to pursue a Master’s Degree.290 He was 
arrested in December at his home in Peoria, Illinois, on suspicion 
of handling money for al Qaeda.291 He was questioned about 
credit card fraud and eventually charged with both forgery and 
perjury.292 Almost two years after his initial arrest, on a Friday, 
the court scheduled a hearing on pretrial motions.293 The 
following Monday, he was certified by Presidential decree as an 
enemy combatant and transferred to the Naval Brig in South 
Carolina.294 To quote Judge Motz again: 
Since that time (that is, for five years) the military has held 
al-Marri as an enemy combatant, without charge and without 
any indication when this confinement will end. For the first 
sixteen months of his military confinement, the Government 
did not permit al-Marri any communication with the outside 
world, including his attorneys, his wife, and his children. He 
                                                                                                     
 289. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (Motz, J., concurring, joined by Michael, King, and Gregory, JJ.), 
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). 
 290. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 291. Id. at 165–66.  
 292. Id. at 164.  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 164–65. 
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alleges that he was denied basic necessities, interrogated 
through measures creating extreme sensory deprivation, and 
threatened with violence. A pending civil action challenges the 
“inhuman, degrading,” and “abusive” conditions of his 
confinement.295 
The original panel of the Fourth Circuit, led by Judge Motz 
over one dissent, held that he must be released or tried.296 Judge 
Motz pointed out that the Government 
does not assert that al-Marri: (1) is a citizen, or affiliate of the 
armed forces, of any nation at war with the United States; 
(2) was seized on or near a battlefield on which the armed 
forces of the United States or its allies were engaged in 
combat; (3) was ever in Afghanistan during the armed conflict 
between the United States and the Taliban there; or 
(4) directly participated in any hostilities against United 
States or allied armed forces.297 
Judge Motz was at pains to point out that the Government’s 
allegations would justify trying al-Marri for very serious offenses, 
but there was nothing to justify extrajudicial Executive detention 
of someone who never directly participated in hostilities against 
the United States.298  
When the Fourth Circuit reheard this case en banc, the 
result was a highly fractured set of opinions.299 Judge Wilkinson 
believed the AUMF authorized al-Marri’s detention as an enemy 
combatant on the basis of his alleged affiliation with the Taliban 
or al Qaeda.300 The “low-water mark” for judicial independence in 
                                                                                                     
 295. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (Motz, J., concurring, joined by Michael, King, and Gregory, JJ.), 
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).  
 296. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating the 
Government could return al-Marri to civilian prosecutors and try him, but may 
not subject him to military detention indefinitely). 
 297. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).  
 298. See id. at 164 (explaining that no Government allegation established al-
Marri as an enemy combatant even though al-Marri would face grave criminal 
penalties if convicted in civilian criminal court).   
 299. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(per curiam), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) 
(listing seven separate opinions in addition to the per curiam opinion).  
 300. See id. at 294 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(declaring that the plurality ignores the plain language of the AUMF).  
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this drama may be represented by these comments by Judge 
Wilkinson: 
The present case reminds that we live in an age where 
thousands of human beings can be slaughtered by a single 
action and where large swaths of urban landscape can be 
leveled in an instant. If the past was a time of danger for this 
country, it remains no more than prologue for the threats the 
future holds. For courts to resist this political attempt to meet 
these rising dangers risks making the judiciary the most 
dangerous branch. 
 I say this not as an exhortation to panic or fear, but 
rather as a call for prudence. The advance and 
democratization of technology proceeds apace, and our legal 
system must show some recognition of these changing 
circumstances. In other words, law must reflect the actual 
nature of modern warfare. By placing so much emphasis on 
quaint and outmoded notions of enemy states and demarcated 
foreign battlefields, the plurality (the opinion authored by 
Judge Motz) and concurrence (the opinion authored by Judge 
Traxler) misperceive the nature of our present danger, and, in 
doing so, miss the opportunity presented by al-Marri's case to 
develop a framework for dealing with new dangers in our 
future.301 
I suppose it is good the judge said this was not an 
exhortation to panic or fear because otherwise I would have taken 
it for exactly that. It is a call to abandon judicial processes for 
unreviewable discretion of the Executive to imprison anybody at 
any time anywhere simply because other people could be killed. 
What is new in this? What are the “new dangers”? Slaughter of 
innocents has always been with us, and unfortunately will 
continue to be so. The pleas for Executive carte blanche power are 
exactly what the writ of habeas corpus was developed to avoid, 302 
and what many statements in various declarations of human 
                                                                                                     
 301. Id. at 293. 
 302. The infamous British Star Chamber was abandoned in 1641. See The 
National Archives, Court of Star Chamber: 1485–1642, http://www.national 
archives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/star-chamber.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It was a mixture of 
“judges” and “privy councillors” that heard cases in secret and dealt mostly with 
political crimes. Id. Although it started as a seemingly necessary way to deal 
with accusations against powerful persons, it became a major source of 
oppression by the monarchy. 
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rights are all about. The way of unreviewed Executive discretion 
is the way of tyranny. 
The middle ground for the en banc court was struck by Judge 
Traxler, who agreed that the AUMF provided authority for 
detention of a domestic “enemy combatant” but read Hamdi as 
requiring al-Marri be given an opportunity to rebut the claims 
against him.303 This resulted in a divided court’s issuing an order 
for remand for hearing at the district court on the 
counterevidence.304 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.305 Again showing 
contempt for the judicial process, the Government then applied to 
the Court to transfer the prisoner to civilian authorities for trial 
on the original charges, to which the Supreme Court 
acquiesced.306 Al-Marri pleaded guilty to providing material 
support under § 2339B307 and was sentenced to 100 months in 
prison; the sentence initially would have been 180 months under 
the statute, but the judge granted credit of 71 months for time 
spent in custody and another 9 months “to reflect the very severe 
conditions of part of his confinement at the Naval Brig.”308 
D. Damage Actions—Immunity, State Secrets, “Special Factors” 
The three most commonly deployed doctrines to prevent 
recovery by those who have been wrongfully mistreated (allegedly 
in some cases, certainly in others) have been the state secrets 
privilege (SSP), qualified immunity, and the special factors 
exception to federal damage actions.309 These three doctrines are 
                                                                                                     
 303. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 253–54 (Traxler, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (agreeing with the opinion that the AUMF grants the President 
detention powers over enemy combatants, but finding al-Marri did not receive 
fair opportunity to rebut his “enemy combatant” status).  
 304. Id. at 216–17 (per curiam).  
 305. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008). 
 306. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). 
 307. 18 U.S.C. § 2399B (2012).  
 308. Al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 309. See, e.g., George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter Terrorism Via Lawsuit”—
The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 877 (2009) (discussing these three 
doctrines).  
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somewhat intertwined and will be treated in a single section 
devoted to damage actions. 
Damage actions against federal officials begin under the 
Bivens doctrine,310 under which federal courts will imply private 
rights of action from some constitutional provisions, such as Due 
Process for physical abuse, or the Fourth Amendment for 
invasions of privacy.311 
Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from 
money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that 
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and 
(2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the 
challenged conduct.312 
I mentioned above the case of Abdullah al-Kidd, who was 
detained on a material witness warrant and then brought suit 
against former Attorney General Ashcroft, alleging a post-9/11 
policy of using the material-witness statute to detain individuals 
with suspected ties to terrorist organizations.313 His complaint 
alleged that agents detained suspects as material witnesses in 
other cases as a pretext because they had insufficient evidence to 
charge them with a crime.314 Al-Kidd, a native U.S. citizen, was 
arrested in 2003 as he checked in for a flight to Saudi Arabia and 
then held under a material-witness warrant issued by a federal 
magistrate in an unrelated case.315 He was in custody for sixteen 
days and on supervised release until the other trial concluded 
over a year later.316  
                                                                                                     
 310. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
 311. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 523–24 (1978) (applying 
Bivens to commodity futures company’s claims, including personal privacy 
violations); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1054–55 (3d Cir. 1977) (making a 
Bivens argument regarding alleged police abuse against two African-American 
citizens). 
 312. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  
 313. See id. at 2079 (discussing the complaint’s assertion that the Attorney 
General had no intention of calling these detainees as witnesses); see also supra 
notes 259–65 and accompanying text (describing the al-Kidd case). 
 314. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (stating that the Attorney 
General directed the federal officials to detain suspected terrorist supporters 
despite lacking enough evidence for a conviction).  
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
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The Ninth Circuit held that Ashcroft “should have known” 
that a pretextual use of a warrant was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.317 For the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia responded 
in his subtle fashion: 
We have repeatedly told the lower courts—and the Ninth 
Circuit in particular . . . not to define clearly established rights 
at a high level of generality. . . . The Fourth Amendment was a 
response to the English Crown’s use of general warrants, 
which often allowed royal officials to search and seize 
whatever and whomever they pleased while investigating 
crimes or affronts to the Crown. . . . According to the Court of 
Appeals, Ashcroft should have seen that a pretextual warrant 
similarly ‘gut[s] the substantive protections of the Fourth 
Amendmen[t] and allows the State to arrest upon the 
executive’s mere suspicion.’ Ashcroft must be forgiven for 
missing the parallel, which escapes us as well.318 
In a similar case, Javad Iqbal unsuccessfully sued Attorney 
General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller for policies that 
resulted in his being mistreated while in custody awaiting 
trial.319 He alleged that he was placed in a special administrative 
unit and “subjected . . . to harsh conditions of confinement on 
account of his race, religion, or national origin.”320 The Supreme 
Court’s opinion by Justice Kennedy noted that Iqbal’s allegations 
of mistreatment certainly stated violations of constitutional 
rights by unknown guards.321 But nothing in his pleadings tended 
                                                                                                     
 317. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)  
“There is a valid and important distinction between seizing a person 
to determine whether she has committed a crime and seizing a person 
to ask whether she has any information about an unknown person 
who committed a crime a week earlier. . . .” That is precisely the 
distinction at work here, and the reason we hold that Ashcroft’s policy 
as alleged was unconstitutional.  
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part)).  
 318. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Al-Kidd, 580 
F.3d at 972).  
 319. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009) (discussing plaintiff’s 
claims of mistreatment in a maximum security prison). He eventually pleaded 
guilty to charges of identity fraud, served his sentence, and was deported to his 
native Pakistan. Id.  
 320. Id. at 666.  
 321. See id. (“Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if proved, 
demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some governmental actors.”). 
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to validate his speculation that Ashcroft or Mueller had 
authorized or prompted that treatment.322 Thus, applying the 
Court’s recently adopted pleading standards requiring plaintiffs 
to state a “plausible” theory of the facts,323 Iqbal failed to survive 
a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.324 
The state secrets doctrine has two aspects. One aspect 
shields specific pieces of evidence when the privilege is claimed.325 
The more extreme application occurs when the mere existence of 
the litigation would be a threat to national security, resulting in a 
total exception to the Bivens doctrine and dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s case.326 The state secrets privilege protects a wide array 
of governmental action in matters that touch upon national 
security, and everything rides on the government’s ability to 
persuade a judge of that without even producing any material for 
in camera inspection: 
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege 
is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security 
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an 
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in 
chambers.327 
                                                                                                     
 322. See id. at 682 (stating the complaint does not allege that Ashcroft or 
Mueller adopted a policy of racial classifications).  
 323. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a 
claim to be “plausible” rather than “conceivable”).  
 324. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (“We hold that respondent’s complaint fails 
to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful 
discrimination against petitioners.”).  
 325. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1953) (describing 
circumstances in which a court should exclude a certain piece of evidence based 
on the state secrets doctrine). 
 326. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876) (stating that courts 
must dismiss suits that would require disclosures involving the secret services 
of the government); Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 94 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(finding “serious questions of justifiability” when secret national security 
information is implicated).   
 327. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9–10 (explaining that a court should not 
automatically require disclosure of the secret information in question to the 
judge). 
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Khaled El-Masri brought a damage action against George 
Tenet, three corporate defendants, ten unnamed employees of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and ten unnamed employees 
of the defendant corporations.328 He alleged that he was originally 
detained by Macedonian authorities, handed over to CIA 
operatives who then transported him to Afghanistan, and finally 
released somewhere in Albania.329 Along the way, he claimed to 
have been “beaten, drugged, bound, and blindfolded during 
transport; confined in a small, unsanitary cell; interrogated 
several times; and consistently prevented from communicating 
with anyone outside the detention facility.”330 
The Fourth Circuit held that the claim inexorably involved 
privileged state secrets and that the lawsuit could not proceed at 
all.331 For the plaintiff even to make a prima facie showing of his 
treatment, he would have to introduce evidence about CIA 
operations.332  
Such a showing could be made only with evidence that exposes 
how the CIA organizes, staffs, and supervises its most 
sensitive intelligence operations. . . . With respect to the 
defendant corporations and their unnamed employees, El-
Masri would have to demonstrate the existence and details of 
CIA espionage contracts, an endeavor practically 
indistinguishable from that categorically barred by Totten and 
Tenet v. Doe.333  
Then if the plaintiff carried the prima facie burden, the 
defendants would not be able to present a cogent defense without 
disclosure of sources and methods.334 
                                                                                                     
 328. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(outlining the complaint). 
 329. Id. at 300–01.  
 330. Id. at 300.  
 331. See id. at 313 (recognizing the gravity of denying the plaintiff a judicial 
forum for his complaint).  
 332. See id. at 309 (determining the plaintiff would have needed to produce 
secret evidence linking the defendants with the alleged harm).  
 333. Id.; see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) 
(establishing an absolute bar to enforcement of confidential agreements to 
conduct espionage, on the ground that “public policy forbids the maintenance of 
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the 
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential”); Tenet v. Doe, 
544 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2005) (reaffirming Totten in unanimous decision). 
 334. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007).  
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The district court in El-Masri concluded its opinion 
dismissing the complaint with these comments: 
[N]othing in this ruling should be taken as a sign of judicial 
approval or disapproval of rendition programs; it is not 
intended to do either. In times of war, our country, chiefly 
through the Executive Branch, must often take exceptional 
steps to thwart the enemy. Of course, reasonable and patriotic 
Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and 
efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision 
holds is that these steps are not proper grist for the judicial 
mill where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit 
and the privilege is validly invoked. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that, putting aside all the legal 
issues, if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true, 
then all fair-minded people, including those who believe that 
state secrets must be protected, that this lawsuit cannot 
proceed, and that renditions are a necessary step to take in 
this war, must also agree that El-Masri has suffered injuries 
as a result of our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy. 
Yet, it is also clear from the result reached here that the only 
sources of that remedy must be the Executive Branch or the 
Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.335 
In a case that generated significant controversy in the United 
Kingdom, Binyam Mohamed was joined by four other detainees 
who alleged they were tortured in various secret locations.336 
They sued the operator of the aircraft (a Gulfstream V) that was 
used by the CIA in “black site” and extraordinary rendition 
operations.337 The Ninth Circuit echoed the sentiments of the 
district judge in El-Masri with this comment: 
This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state 
secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles of our 
liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and 
national security. Although as judges we strive to honor all of 
these principles, there are times when exceptional 
circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between them. 
On those rare occasions, we are bound to follow the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that “even the most compelling necessity 
                                                                                                     
 335. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540–41 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 336. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (outlining plaintiffs’ factual allegations). 
 337. See id. at 1075 (describing plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant 
provided flight planning and logistical support services).  
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cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is 
ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake.” After 
much deliberation, we reluctantly conclude this is such a case, 
and the plaintiffs’ action must be dismissed.338 
Mohamed was repatriated to the United Kingdom and 
created a major controversy with credible allegations of MI5 
involvement in his interrogation and torture.339 The U.K. Court of 
Appeal held that the British version of SSP would not shield 
investigative reports that the court thought made it clear 
Mohamed had been subjected to illegal treatment and raised 
questions about the involvement of British officers.340 Mohamed 
eventually settled his claims against the British Government for 
£1,000,000.341 
A Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, also brought suit in the 
United States unsuccessfully342 and subsequently received a 
significant settlement from his home government. Arar was 
detained while in transit through JFK Airport on the basis of 
information from Canadian authorities.343 His detention for 
twelve days in New York, rendition to Syria, and ten months of 
abuse in a Syrian prison were documented by a Canadian special 
commission.344 His claims in Canada were settled by a $10.5 
million payment and apology from the Canadian government.345 
                                                                                                     
 338. Id. at 1073 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 11 (1953)). 
 339. See Al Rawi v. Security Service, [2010] EWCA (civ) 482 [5] (stating 
plaintiff’s claims that MI5 contributed toward their “detention, rendition and ill 
treatment”).  
 340. See id. at [11] (allowing trial to proceed with a closed material 
procedure).  
 341. See Christian Gysin, Going Out Shopping, the Terror Suspect Who 
Pocketed a Million in Compensation Over Torture Claims, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2055474/Binyam-Mohamed-Ter 
ror-suspect-pocketed-1m-compensation-torture-claims.html (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014) (discussing payout to former terror suspect who was allegedly tortured 
with the complicity of British security services) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 342. See generally Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 343. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN 
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR 27 
(2006), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-
09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf. 
 344. Id. at 27–33.  
 345. See Ian Austen, Canada Reaches Settlement With Torture Victim, N.Y. 
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In Arar’s suit against various U.S. officials, the Second 
Circuit held that he could not state a claim under the Torture 
Victims Protection Act346 because that statute deals only with 
actions taken under color of foreign law and there was no 
allegation that the U.S. officers were acting pursuant to Syrian 
law.347 With regard to his detention for twelve days in New York, 
he might have been able to state a due process claim but his 
complaint did not “specify any culpable action taken by any single 
defendant.”348 Judge Calabresi, joined by several colleagues, 
dissented with this comment: 
I respectfully dissent. . . . [B]ecause I believe that when the 
history of this distinguished court is written, today's majority 
decision will be viewed with dismay, I add a few words of my 
own, “. . . more in sorrow than in anger.”349 
In what it described as a “lamentable case,” complete with details 
of the despicable treatment to which some detainees were 
subjected in Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan, the D.C. District Court 
reached a similar conclusion.350 In addition to the “crucial 
national-security and foreign policy considerations” discussed by 
the Second Circuit, the D.C. court engaged in a more extended 
discussion of Eisentrager and its progeny because the plaintiffs in 
these cases had never attempted to enter the United States and 
indeed were detained in areas of active hostilities.351 
The plaintiffs, as well as amici [retired military officers], 
contest the notion that a Bivens remedy would impose judicial 
oversight over military decision-making and chill military 
                                                                                                     
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/americas/26cnd-
canada.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing the settlement and 
three separate government apologies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 346. Torture Victims Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 
73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).  
 347. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating Arar did 
not allege defendants possessed power under Syrian law).  
 348. Id. at 569. 
 349. Id. at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET, act 1, sc. 2).  
 350. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 
(D.D.C. 2007).  
 351. See id. at 95–96 (discussing Eisentrager as “the most instructive” case 
on point).  
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effectiveness on the battlefield, arguing instead that 
“providing an effective remedy for the violation of Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights would be wholly consonant with 
longstanding military laws and regulations and would not 
entangle the Court in any inappropriate inquiry.”. . .  
 The Court cautions against the myopic approach 
advocated by the plaintiffs and amici, which essentially frames 
the issue as whether torture is universally prohibited and 
thereby warrants a judicially-created remedy under the 
circumstances. There is no getting around the fact that 
authorizing monetary damages remedies against military 
officials engaged in an active war would invite enemies to use 
our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to 
act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our liberty 
and national interests, a prospect the Supreme Court found 
intolerable in Eisentrager.352 
Shafiq Rasul (the titular petitioner in the 2004 Supreme 
Court case out of Guantanamo353) was repatriated to the United 
Kingdom in 2004.354 He and three others brought suit against a 
variety of federal officials, including Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld, for tortious mistreatment and religious 
discrimination.355 Rasul and two others alleged that they were in 
Afghanistan to provide humanitarian relief when they were 
captured by the Northern Alliance and handed over to western 
forces.356 Another co-plaintiff, al-Harith, alleged that he was 
actually kidnapped out of Pakistan by the Taliban, from whom he 
escaped before he was mistakenly detained by western forces.357 
The D.C. Circuit held that  
a. Their claims under the Alien Tort Statute358 should have 
been brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,359 which has 
                                                                                                     
 352. Id. at 104–05 (citations omitted). 
 353. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 354. See generally Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 563 
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 355. Id. at 649–50. 
 356. See id. at 649–50 (describing the plaintiffs’ capture by a Uzbek warlord 
and transfer into U.S. custody).  
 357. See id. at 650 (repeating al-Harith’s claims that U.S. and British forces 
detained him after his escape from the Taliban).  
 358. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
 359. Id. §§ 1346(b), 2674.   
U.S. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 375 
a specialized procedure that must be followed when federal 
officers are sued for acts done in the scope of employment;360 
b. Their constitutional claims were unavailing because 
nonresident aliens outside the United States have no 
constitutional rights and because the claims would be barred 
by the good faith immunity of the defendants;361  
c. Their religious freedom claims were not cognizable under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)362 because the 
statute has no application to aliens located outside sovereign 
United States territory at the time their alleged RFRA claim 
arose.363 
One more individual claimant for compensation is Jose 
Padilla.364 As described above, Padilla was arrested at O’Hare 
Airport and confined in isolation in a military brig for almost four 
years until he was finally tried and convicted in a civilian federal 
court trial.365 His civil suit then charged John Yoo with various 
constitutional violations in rendering bogus legal opinions that 
permitted Padilla to be subjected to extrajudicial 
imprisonment.366  
Yoo argued that “special factors” counseled against 
implication of a Bivens claim.367 The court assessed the national 
security implications of Yoo’s arguments by noting that Padilla 
was not alleged to have taken up arms against the United States 
or otherwise shown to have been “engaged in armed conflict” with 
the United States, so the notion of making him a prisoner under 
                                                                                                     
 360. See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 563 F.3d 
527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that this procedure includes exhaustion of 
administrative remedies).  
 361. See id. at 663 (stating that “Guantanamo detainees lack constitutional 
rights because they are aliens without property of presence in the United 
States”).  
 362. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)   
 363. See Rasul, 512 F.3d at 671–72 (determining the plaintiffs did not 
constitute “persons” under the RFRA).  
 364. See generally Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 365. See id. at 1013–14 (describing the harsh conditions Padilla faced in the 
Naval Brig); see also supra notes 267–71 and accompanying text (discussing 
Padilla).  
 366. See id. at 1015–17 (describing the various memoranda the defendant, a 
law professor, wrote about detention and interrogation).  
 367. Id. at 1022.  
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the law of war was not a reason for denying him relief.368 Indeed, 
unlike the allegations made by Iqbal against Attorney General 
Ashcroft, “the Court finds Padilla has alleged sufficient facts to 
satisfy the requirement that Yoo set in motion a series of events 
that resulted in the deprivation of Padilla's constitutional 
rights.”369 And with regard to Yoo’s claim for qualified immunity: 
The Court finds that Padilla alleges a violation of his 
constitutional rights which were clearly established at the 
time of the conduct. Further, based on the fact that the 
allegations involve conduct that would be unconstitutional if 
directed at any detainee, a reasonable federal officer could 
have believed the conduct was lawful. Therefore, Yoo is not 
entitled to qualified immunity.370 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Yoo’s 
derelictions were not so clearly established at the time as to have 
stripped him of qualified immunity.371 The Ninth Circuit stated 
the applicable standard to be whether “at the time he acted the 
law was . . . ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would 
have understood that what he [wa]s doing violate[d]’ the 
plaintiffs’ rights.”372 Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit held that 
Padilla, as represented by his mother in a separate action, could 
not bring a Bivens claim against anyone for his allegedly 
wrongful detention and mistreatment.373 The court reasoned, 
similarly to its opinion in El-Masri, that any exploration into the 
circumstances of his treatment would embroil the courts in 
second-guessing the actions of the executive and legislature at a 
time of national crisis.374 Those “special circumstances” thus 
occasioned hesitation in implying a Bivens remedy.375 
                                                                                                     
 368. Id. at 1027. 
 369. Id. at 1034.  
 370. Id. at 1038 (citation omitted).  
 371. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 372. Id. at 750 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)).  
 373. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 560 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 
defendants were entitled to a qualified immunity).  
 374. See id. at 558 (discussing court practice of “preferring that Congress 
explicitly authorize suits that implicate the command decisions of those charged 
with our national defense”). 
 375. See id. at 556 (concluding that a variety of “sources of hesitation in 
Padilla’s Bivens claim” require that the action not be maintained).  
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Finally, there is one institutional plaintiff with a near-victory 
in a compensation case but no compensation: the Al-Haramain 
Foundation.376 In protracted litigation regarding the warrantless 
and FISA-less surveillance program carried out by the NSA, the 
plaintiff foundation first had to show standing to sue.377 The 
foundation was able to persuade the Ninth Circuit that it had 
probably been the target of unauthorized wiretaps because 
otherwise there would have been no evidence on which the 
Government could have based its petitions to have the 
organization declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).378 
After passing that hurdle, the plaintiff was then met with the 
SSP, to which the trial court answered that FISA preempted SSP 
by providing a civil remedy for unauthorized wiretaps.379 Allowing 
the Government repeated opportunities to come forward with 
evidence that surveillance of the foundation had in fact been 
authorized by the FISA Court, the district court finally entered 
summary judgment for the plaintiff and assessed damages and 
attorney fees.380 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant 
of summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity.381 
E. “Special Needs” Exception—Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 
In December 2005, an article in the New York Times revealed 
the existence of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), under 
which “President Bush secretly authorized the National Security 
Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United 
                                                                                                     
 376. See generally Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA 
Telecomm. Records Litig.), 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 377. See id. at 1194 (finding prior Ninth Circuit mandate did not preclude 
plaintiffs from attempting to establish standing).  
 378. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“The organization posits that the very existence of the TSP, and Al-
Haramain’s status as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ suggest that the 
government is in fact intercepting Al-Haramain’s communications.”). 
 379. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 
(stating that the “FISA displaces the SSP in cases within its purview”).  
 380. See id. at 1204 (requesting from plaintiffs a proposed form of judgment 
for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees).  
 381. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Obama, 690 F.3d 1089, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2012), amended, 705 F.3d 845 (2012).   
378 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) 
States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the 
court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic 
spying.”382 Apparently, the TSP was one of a collection of 
clandestine intelligence activities referred to as the “President’s 
Surveillance Program,” with the other parts of the program 
remaining classified.383 As events have unfolded, we have been 
exposed to reports of NSA projects called Carnivore and PRISM. 
In May 2013, Edward Snowden became famous by going public 
with reports of massive collection of phone and e-mail records of 
American citizens.384 As if anyone was really surprised by these 
disclosures, some politicians called him a traitor and the 
government filed espionage charges against him.385 
But even without regard to the unauthorized surveillance, 
the very premise of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) is highly debatable and has been subjected to minimal 
judicial scrutiny. FISA386 was enacted in 1978 “to provide 
legislative authorization and regulation for all electronic 
surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign 
intelligence purposes.”387 The whole premise for a secret special 
court is something called the “special needs” doctrine. That 
doctrine creates an exception to the Fourth Amendment, which 
would otherwise require a judicial warrant before any electronic 
surveillance (wiretap, e-mail intercepts, and the like) affecting 
                                                                                                     
 382. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/ 
16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/polit
ics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 383. See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. FOR THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & OFFICE OF DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM (2009) (discussing what constituted the President’s Surveillance 
Program). This report was mandated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301, 122 Stat. 2467 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 384. See Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden With Espionage, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-
21/world/40116763_1_hong-kong-nsa-justice-department (describing Snowden’s 
activities resulting in espionage charges). 
 385. See id. (discussing the charges against Snowden). 
 386. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C §§ 1801–1812 (2012)).  
 387. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9 (1978). 
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U.S. persons.388 The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of 
“the people,” which could easily exclude foreign governments and 
similar entities but might include foreign citizens lawfully within 
the United States. Therefore, the “special needs” of intelligence 
work would seem to apply, if at all, only to scrutinizing suspected 
agents of foreign powers, which is how the statute at first was 
constructed. 
The most significant difference between a FISA court order 
and an ordinary warrant is that a warrant requires a showing of 
probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance has 
committed or is about to commit a crime, while the FISA order 
originally could be based on probable cause to believe that the 
target was an “agent of a foreign power,” which included foreign 
political organizations.389 After 9/11, FISA was amended to allow 
surveillance of any person believed to be outside the United 
States (whose conversations, of course, could include U.S. citizens 
at home).390  
The premise of FISA was that a court-order scheme for 
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance could be devised 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of 
reasonableness.391FISA created a special court of designated 
federal judges—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC)—that can issue orders authorizing electronic surveillance 
                                                                                                     
 388. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 521 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (“The 
‘special needs’ doctrine . . . is an exception to the general rule that a search must 
be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”).  
 389. See 50 U.S.C § 1801(b) (2012) (defining “agent of a foreign power” with 
distinctions between U.S. citizens and “any persons”).  
 390. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(implementing “enhanced surveillance procedures” in order to “deter and punish 
terrorist acts”) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 391. See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 14–15  
The departures here from conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine 
have, therefore, been given close scrutiny to ensure that the 
procedures established in [FISA] are reasonable in relation to 
legitimate foreign counterintelligence requirements and the protected 
rights of individuals. Their reasonableness depends, in part, upon an 
assessment of the difficulties of investigating activities planned, 
directed, and supported from abroad by foreign intelligence services 
and foreign-based terrorist groups. Other factors include the 
international responsibilities of the United States, . . . and the need to 
maintain the secrecy of lawful counterintelligence sources and 
methods. 
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to gather foreign intelligence.392 A subsequent amendment 
extended that authority to issuing court orders to conduct 
physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.393 
Several courts struggled with whether “foreign intelligence” 
had to be the “primary purpose” of the surveillance.394 The First 
Circuit stated “the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the 
primary purpose of the surveillance.”395 The Ninth Circuit refused 
to distinguish between “purpose or primary purpose . . . . We 
refuse to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and 
intelligence investigations.”396 
These discussions about the “purpose” requirement prompted 
the FISA Court of Review, prior to 9/11, to approve the DOJ’s 
practice of erecting a “wall” between criminal investigations and 
intelligence investigations.397 The idea was that the looser 
procedures of FISA should not be used for ordinary criminal 
proceedings.398 The attacks of 9/11 prompted much hand-wringing 
over perceived failures of the “intelligence community.” But there 
is no way of knowing how many hundreds or thousands of other 
leads similar to those of 9/11 could be followed to dead ends. Just 
because there was one needle in the haystack does not mean that 
one should have been found or that there were others to find. 
Nevertheless, the USA PATRIOT Act—the “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
                                                                                                     
 392. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1978) (allowing the appointment of judges to the 
new court).  
 393. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
359, §§ 301–309, 108 Stat. 3423 (1995) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1824 
(1994)).  
 394. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 571–73 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(analyzing FISA in the case of an American citizen researching and developing 
explosives for the Provisional Irish Republican Army); United States v. 
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing FISA in the case of 
Armenian terrorists).  
 395. Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572. 
 396. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965. 
 397. See William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret 
Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1148–49 (2003) 
(discussing the origins of the “wall”). 
 398. See id. (noting that using FISA for espionage was acceptable, as “the 
danger of espionage or international terrorism is grave, and that the privacy 
intrusions are limited to the collection of information for foreign intelligence 
purposes”).  
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to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act”399—was enacted six 
weeks after 9/11. It has served in some minds as a lightning rod 
for debate, but could also be seen as a smokescreen for many 
government policies that have nothing to do with the legislation 
itself (for example, military detentions, harsh interrogation, and 
extraordinary rendition).  
For our purposes here, the principal impact of PATRIOT was 
to modify FISA to require that gathering foreign intelligence 
information is “a significant purpose” (rather than “the purpose”) 
of surveillance.400  
Following the amendment of FISA to require that foreign 
intelligence be only a significant purpose, rather than the 
primary purpose, of the surveillance,401 the Attorney General 
issued a memorandum in March 2002 allowing full exchange of 
information between law enforcement and intelligence units, and 
permitting criminal prosecutors to consult with and advise 
intelligence officials regarding FISA surveillance and searches.402 
These changes were permissible because the PATRIOT Act 
“allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, 
as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.”403 
So interpreted, the Act essentially tears down the wall between 
foreign intelligence and criminal investigation. 
In a unanimous opinion, the FISA Court balked at the idea 
that criminal investigation could be the primary purpose of 
surveillance under FISA and rejected the new procedures.404 In 
                                                                                                     
 399. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 400. See id. § 218 (stating that certain sections of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act are amended by striking “the purpose” and inserting “a 
significant purpose”) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) 
(2012)).  
 401. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(6)(B), 1823 (a)(6)(B) (2012) (describing how a 
significant purpose is required for surveillance). 
 402. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Intelligence Sharing Procedures for 
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted 
by the FBI, FAS.ORG (Mar. 6, 2002), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) 
(“The Act also expressly authorizes intelligence officers who are using FISA to 
‘consult’ with federal law enforcement officers . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 403. Id.  
 404. See In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
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the opinion of the FISC, separation of intelligence gathering from 
law enforcement is necessary under the Fourth Amendment.405  
In the first-ever appeal from the FISC, the Court of Review 
(FISCR) in its In re Sealed Case406 decision reversed the lower 
court’s retention of the wall of separation.407 FISCR described the 
wall as a “false dichotomy” between intelligence gathering and 
criminal investigation.408 In its view, foreign intelligence 
information includes evidence of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, 
and other crimes; likewise, a U.S. person who is an agent of a 
foreign power is necessarily involved in criminal conduct.409 
“Indeed, it is virtually impossible to read the 1978 FISA to 
exclude from its purpose the prosecution of foreign intelligence 
crimes.”410 
Several years later, a district court judge in Oregon 
disagreed with the FISCR and declared the amended FISA 
scheme to be an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.411 The facts of the case were quite compelling: 
Following the Madrid subway bombing of March 11, 2004, 
Spanish authorities submitted to the FBI a fingerprint from a 
plastic bag found in the subway.412 The fingerprint was identified 
as belonging to Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon lawyer, former U.S. 
Army officer, and practicing Muslim.413 As a result of the 
                                                                                                     
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622–23 (FISA Ct. 2002) (discussing how the FISA 
Court rejected new procedures), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 405. Id. at 622–23. 
 406. 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  
 407. Id. at 746. 
 408. Id. at 725  (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 
(4th Cir. 1980)).  
 409. See id. (upholding the government’s argument that foreign intelligence 
information includes “evidence of crimes such as espionage, sabotage, or 
terrorism”). 
 410. Id. at 723. 
 411. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d. 1023, 1042 (D. Or. 
2007) (“After the Patriot Act, however, FISA surveillance, including the 
surveillance at bar, may have as its ‘programmatic purpose’ the generation of 
evidence for law enforcement purposes—which is forbidden without criminal 
probable cause and a warrant.”), overruled by Mayfield v. United States, 599 
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 412. Id. at 1027. 
 413. Id. 
U.S. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 383 
fingerprint identification, the FBI applied for and received a 
FISA order to wiretap Mayfield’s phones, to place listening 
devices in his home, and to conduct sneak-and-peak searches of 
his home and office.414 Mayfield was then arrested and detained 
for more than two weeks.415 Finally, he was released after 
Spanish authorities notified the FBI that they had matched the 
fingerprint to an Algerian in their custody.416 In 2006, Mayfield 
received an official apology and a $2 million settlement,417 which 
still allowed him to pursue his constitutional challenge to 
FISA.418  
In ruling on this claim, the district court described how “a 
seemingly minor change in wording”—from the purpose to a 
significant purpose—has a profound effect on government powers 
under FISA:  
Now, for the first time in our Nation’s history, the government 
can conduct surveillance to gather evidence for use in a 
criminal case without a traditional warrant, as long as it 
presents a non-reviewable assertion that it also has a 
significant interest in the targeted person for foreign 
intelligence purposes. Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights 
                                                                                                     
 414. Id. at 1028. 
 415. Id. at 1029. 
 416. See id. (“[O]n May 20, 2004, news reports revealed, that Spain had 
matched the Madrid fingerprint with an Algerian, Ouhane Daoud. Mayfield was 
released from prison the following day.”). The incident stands as a watershed for 
fingerprint evidence, which was once considered infallible, but is now recognized 
as fraught with potential for error. See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS 
OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 1–3 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/228091.pdf; Jennifer Mnookin, The Achilles’ Heel of Fingerprints, 
WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A27 (stating that “the science of fingerprinting is 
surprisingly underdeveloped” and that “[w]e lack good evidence about how often 
examiners make mistakes, nor is there a consensus about how to determine 
what counts as a match”). 
 417. See Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed by Ore. Lawyer; $2 Million Will 
Be Paid for Wrongful Arrest After Madrid Attack, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at 
A3 (discussing how Mayfield and his family received $2 million dollars). 
 418. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Mayfield lacked standing to 
bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA. See Mayfield v. United States, 
599 F. 3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding Mayfield lacked standing to pursue 
his Fourth Amendment claim because his injuries were already substantially 
redressed by the settlement agreement); infra notes 423–24 and accompanying 
text (stating that a declaratory judgment would not impact Mayfield or his 
family). 
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in 1791, the government has been prohibited from gathering 
evidence for use in a prosecution against an American citizen 
in a courtroom unless the government could prove the 
existence of probable cause that a crime has been committed. 
The hard won legislative compromise previously embodied in 
FISA reduced the probable cause requirement only for 
national security intelligence gathering. The Patriot Act 
effectively eliminates that compromise by allowing the 
Executive Branch to bypass the Fourth Amendment in 
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution.419  
The district court found the FISCR’s application of the 
special needs doctrine to be “without merit.”420 After the 
PATRIOT Act amendments, a FISA order need not meet a special 
need beyond ordinary law enforcement.421 Instead, an order could 
serve the same objective as a search warrant, having “as its 
‘programmatic purpose’ the generation of evidence for law 
enforcement purposes—which is forbidden without criminal 
probable cause and a warrant.”422  
The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that Mayfield 
lacked standing because he had settled the damages claim “and a 
declaratory judgment would not likely impact him or his 
family.”423 And although at least one judge said he “shares the 
very significant concerns that the ‘significant purpose’ standard 
violates the Fourth Amendment,”424 the Mayfield opinion has 
been termed an “outlier.”425 Thus, with the exception of a lone 
judge in Oregon, courts have universally accepted the argument 
                                                                                                     
 419. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d. 1023, 1036–37 (D. Or. 
2007), overruled by Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).   
 420. See id. at 1041 (“The FISCR also attempts, without merit, to 
distinguish the Supreme Court's ‘special needs’ cases.”). 
 421. See id. (discussing how the PATRIOT Act allows FISA to not require 
the special needs carved out by the Supreme Court to violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 422. Id. at 1042. 
 423. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 424. United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996 (D. Minn. 2008). 
The Warsame court did not decide the issue, however, as it found that the 
primary purpose of the FISA surveillance at issue was to gather foreign 
intelligence. Id. at 994. 
425. See United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
119470, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (“The Court is not persuaded by the one 
outlier district court case [Mayfield] which held that FISA, as it currently exists, 
violates the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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that FISA is not subject to the standards applicable to judicial 
search warrants.426 The common rubric is that foreign 
intelligence is different and gives rise to “special needs” of 
government surveillance. It is difficult, however, to see what is 
“special” about surveilling alleged plotters of violence. Perhaps 
special needs could apply in the case of foreign governments or 
political entities, which are not part of “the people” protected by 
the Fourth Amendment anyway. The only persons who come 
within the concerns of FISA are really foreign citizens in the 
United States whom the government has probable cause to 
believe are acting as agents of a foreign power. Thus, the whole 
premise of FISA as a special needs exception to the Fourth 
Amendment could be flawed even before the change to “a 
significant purpose,” and is surely flawed, as the Oregon court 
believed, when the relaxed standards have the “primary purpose” 
of law enforcement. 
The “special needs” cases to which the courts have referred in 
creating this exception have all been instances in which the 
target of the search had undertaken some voluntary departure 
from the private realm—such as traveling by air, driving on a 
public street, or operating a restaurant—in which the public 
safety demanded an inspection without regard to probable 
cause.427 It is possible that taking to the airwaves through 
telephone or internet is a similar departure from normal life such 
that we have relinquished any claim to privacy. But this 
conclusion should at least deal carefully with all the Supreme 
Court precedents regarding expectations of privacy, the issue 
covered in the next section.428 
                                                                                                     
 426. The Mayfield opinion has been termed an “outlier.” United States v. 
Kashmiri, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119470, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010). Every 
other federal court has upheld FISA as amended by the PATRIOT Act, often 
relying on the reasoning of In re Sealed Case. See, e.g., United States v. Abu-
Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). 
 427. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (discussing the 
search of a probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–703 
(1987) (analyzing the search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721–25 (1987)  (evaluating the work-related 
searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 
337–342 (1985) (describing the search of student’s property by school officials); 
Bell v. Wolfish,  441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979) (analyzing the intricacies of body 
cavity searches of prison inmates). 
 428. The Court held in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967), that 
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Just dealing with the basic justification of FISA, with the 
lone exception of a district judge in Oregon, we have the apparent 
specter of the Judiciary yielding to executive claims of special 
needs arising from the threat of violence, resulting in a failure of 
judicial review and loss of judicial independence. But, in 2013 
came the “revelation” that the FISA Court had authorized 
unlimited recording of data communications by U.S. citizens 
within the United States—a revelation of little surprise to those 
who were following the issue. 
F. Carte Blanche for Electronic Snooping 
The battle over NSA surveillance probably has less to do with 
actual invasions of privacy and more to do with the sense that 
government decided it can do whatever it wants to do with total 
impunity. The existence of secret NSA programs is not at all 
surprising to those who have paid close attention to this issue for 
the last decade. The fact is that our government was never open 
or transparent about what it was doing, and we knew it was not. 
For example, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in a number 
of public statements during 2005 and 2006 was always careful to 
say “the program the President has disclosed” is legal, leaving 
open the inference that there was much more that had not been 
disclosed: 
A word of caution here. This remains a highly classified 
program. . . . So my remarks today speak only to those 
activities confirmed publicly by the President, and not to other 
purported activities described in press reports. These press 
accounts are in almost every case, in one way or another, 
misinformed, confusing, or wrong. And unfortunately, they 
have caused concern over the potential breadth of what the 
President has actually authorized.429 
Nowhere in the many public statements of the era—all of 
which are contained on the DOJ website—is there any mention of 
                                                                                                     
we have an expectation of privacy in telephonic communications. The NSA 
surveillance program is built on later precedent regarding the bare data of 
phone numbers and e-mail addresses. 
 429. E-mail from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, to U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs 2 (Jan. 24, 2006, 10:30 AM EST), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance15.pdf.  
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the undisclosed activities of the NSA. Naturally we would get 
“press accounts . . . [that were] misinformed, confusing, or 
wrong.”430 But we probably got some information that was 
accurate. 
What do we know now in 2014? We know that NSA and its 
affiliated agencies are capable of reading all our e-mail and 
listening to our phone conversations.431 Do they do so? They 
would have us believe they are too busy to bother with us little 
people. But it is also clear that if the “metadata mining” reveals a 
pattern of curiosity, then it is a simple matter to reach into the 
grab bag and pull out everything any particular individual has 
said for a long period of time.432 Indeed, some instances of 
unauthorized snooping into content have been acknowledged and 
one FISA judge has described the NSA as having repeatedly 
misrepresented its activities to the court.433 
The FISA Court has approved “programmatic” surveillance 
by interpreting the word “relevant”434 to mean basically all 
electronic communications, which can be monitored for suspicious 
patterns.435 “And under the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard, there 
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 431. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social 
Connections of U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013),  
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 433. In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], BR 08-13, at 5–6 
(FISA Ct. March 2, 2009), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/ 
pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf (describing the 
government’s “non-compliance with the Court’s orders”).  
 434. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2012) (information likely to be obtained . . . is 
relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities). 
 435. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], BR 13-109, at 18–
23 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-
09-primary-order.pdf; see also Wayne McCormack, Privacy, the NSA, and 
Impunity, UTAH LAW TODAY (July 15, 2013), http://today.law.utah.edu/ 
projects/blog-privacy-the-nsa-and-impunity/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter McCormack, Privacy] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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is no judicial review when someone decides to look into the 
content of those communications.”436 
Frankly, I’m not so sure that privacy of information is really 
that important, except to the extent that I need to be able to 
protect my bank accounts from being raided. What makes the 
NSA dustup more disturbing is the feeling within government 
that government can act with impunity in the name of “national 
security.”437  
If they can read my e-mails today, can they haul me off to a 
military brig without judicial approval tomorrow? Oh, wait, they 
did that already—kept several people locked up for years with 
total impunity—even tortured with impunity.438 
Recently, two judges have taken a hard look at the NSA 
activity and disagreed on the merits.439 At least, these two judges 
did not yield to the temptation to abdicate judicial independence 
in the face of the dreaded word “terrorism.”440 
G. Standing 
The U.S. federal courts have a rather mystical, ethereal 
approach to their “special place” in separation of powers. Part of 
the mystique is a doctrine called “standing,” which I have 
described elsewhere as part of the “Mythology of Justiciability.”441 
The heart of the doctrine is that a person who is not able to show 
an injury by another person has no claim of right against that 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 436. McCormack, Privacy, supra, note 435.   
 437. See NSA/CSS Strategy, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.nsa.gov/about/strategic_plan/(last updated Mar. 31 2011) (describing 
the goals and strategies employed by the NSA to protect national security) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 438. See supra notes 5–24 and accompanying text (discussing various cases 
in which people were imprisoned and tortured with total impunity).  
 439. Klayman v. Obama, Civil Action No. 13–0881(RJL), 2013 WL 6598728, 
at  (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (determining the bulk collection of metadata to be 
invalid); ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994(WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *24 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (upholding practice). 
 440. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry’s Safety, CRIM. JUST. 
4, 5–6 (2002) (discussing how terrorism has, in certain circumstances, led to 
judicial abdication).  
 441. See generally McCormack, The Justiciability Myth, supra note 72.  
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other person. The mystery is why we need to waste barrels of ink 
and jurisprudential energy on a point basic to all of law—if you 
haven’t harmed me, I don’t have a claim against you.442 
Be that as it may, there are two instances in which federal 
courts have turned blind eyes to what would seem to be palpable 
injuries, either likely or threatened. These are the cases dealing 
with the illegal surveillance by the NSA under the heading of the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP),443 and the targeted killing 
of a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi.444 
1. Have I Been Bugged? 
A number of lawsuits challenged the NSA program. One suit 
was brought by the ACLU on behalf of a group of individuals and 
groups who regularly conducted international telephone and 
Internet communications for legitimate professional reasons (for 
example, journalism or the practice of law).445 A district court in 
Michigan granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, finding 
that the TSP violated FISA, the First and Fourth Amendments, 
and the separation of powers doctrine.446 On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the 
action.447 They could not show that any particular conversation 
was intercepted, nor could the plaintiffs claim that any personal 
interest was harmed by refraining from conversations that might 
                                                                                                     
 442. See id. (discussing the doctrine of standing and its various nuances). 
 443. Cf. Ellen Nakashima, AT&T Plaintiffs Cite McConnell Remarks, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 1, 2007,  (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (“The Bush administration has 
asked Congress to grant the phone companies immunity from lawsuits arising 
from the [TSP].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 444. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1–14 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(describing the litigation and the actual killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi). 
 445. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (discussing 
how persons who allegedly conducted regular international telephone and 
internet communications brought action challenging NSA’s secret program). 
 446. See id. at 782 (“The Permanent Injunction of the TSP requested by 
Plaintiffs is granted inasmuch as each of the factors required to be met to 
sustain such an injunction have undisputedly been met.”). 
 447. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t follows that if the 
plaintiffs lack standing to litigate their declaratory judgment claim, they must 
also lack standing to pursue an injunction.”). 
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be monitored.448 Judge Gilman dissented on the ground that the 
attorney-plaintiffs had a clear duty to refrain from 
communicating with clients when those communications were 
likely to be intercepted, and were thus able to show a cognizable 
harm from the threat of interception.449 Speaking to the merits, 
Judge Gilman argued that the TSP was illegal because “the clear 
wording of FISA and Title III that these statutes provide the 
‘exclusive means’ for the government to engage in electronic 
surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence.”450 
At the same time, the Al-Haramain Foundation and two of 
its lawyers filed a similar action against the government in 
Oregon district court.451 Al-Haramain is a Muslim charity 
designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which 
freezes the organization’s assets and makes it illegal for others to 
do business with it.452 At one point, the Government 
inadvertently disclosed a “top secret” document that proved Al-
Haramain had been subjected to warrantless surveillance and 
prompted a further claim for unlawful surveillance.453 The 
Government sought to dismiss the case by invoking the state 
secrets privilege, which the district court rejected on the basis 
that the existence of the TSP was not a secret, and that “no harm 
                                                                                                     
 448. See id. at 656–57  
By refraining from communications (i.e., the potentially harmful 
conduct), the plaintiffs have negated any possibility that the NSA will 
ever actually intercept their communications and thereby avoided the 
anticipated harm—this is typical of declaratory judgment and 
perfectly permissible. . . . But, by proposing only injuries that result 
from this refusal to engage in communications (e.g., the inability to 
conduct their professions without added burden and expense), they 
attempt to supplant an insufficient, speculative injury with an injury 
that appears sufficiently imminent and concrete, but is only 
incidental to the alleged wrong . . . . 
 449. See id. at 695 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the attorney-
plaintiffs were able to show harm and distinguishing the facts of this case from 
precedent on which the majority opinion relies). 
 450. Id. at 720; see also supra note 448 (detailing the majority’s argument).  
 451. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 
2006). 
 452. Id. at 1218. 
 453. See id. at 1219 (describing the inadvertent disclosure and the sensitive 
information the document contained). 
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to the national security would occur if plaintiffs [were] able to 
prove the general point that they were subject to surveillance as 
revealed in the Sealed Document,” so long as no other 
information in the document was revealed.454 
The Ninth Circuit granted the Government’s request for 
interlocutory review of the state secrets issue,455 holding that the 
public disclosures about the TSP had already made the basic 
dimensions of the program known and thus the state secrets 
privilege did not foreclose the lawsuit entirely.456 Nevertheless, 
the top-secret document was protected by the privilege, and the 
plaintiffs would not be allowed to introduce their memory of the 
document into evidence.457 Although the court believed that the 
plaintiffs could not establish standing without the document, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether FISA might preempt the state secrets 
privilege.458 On remand, the district court first held that FISA 
would, in fact, preempt the privilege, but a remedy would be 
available only on behalf of someone who was an “aggrieved 
person” under the statute.459  
The plaintiffs were able to rely on public announcements by 
government officials and publicly available press reports to make 
a prima facie case, based on nonclassified information, that they 
were aggrieved persons because of wiretaps and e-mail intercepts 
                                                                                                     
 454. Id. at 1224. 
 455. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 456. See id. at 1193 (noting the disclosure of the TSP and agreeing with the 
district court that the lawsuit cannot therefore be barred on a state secret 
basis). 
 457. See id. at 1204–05 (providing that each individuals’ memory of the 
sealed document’s contents and speculation about the document’s contents were 
“completely barred from further disclosure in this litigation”). 
 458. See id. at 1206 (“Rather than consider the issue for the first time on 
appeal, we remand to the district court to consider whether FISA preempts the 
state secrets privilege and for any proceedings collateral to that 
determination.”). 
 459. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomm. Records 
Litig.), 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The district court held that 
50 U.S.C. § 1810 contained an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 
1125; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012) (providing that an “aggrieved person” who 
suffers from illegal electronic surveillance may recover damages, including 
punitive damages and attorney’s fees). 
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without a court order.460 After extended recalcitrance by the 
Government, the district court ordered:  
Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case and defendants 
have foregone multiple opportunities to show that a warrant 
existed, including specifically rejecting the method created by 
Congress for this very purpose. Defendants’ possession of the 
exclusive knowledge whether or not a FISA warrant was 
obtained, moreover, creates such grave equitable concerns that 
defendants must be deemed estopped from arguing that a 
warrant might have existed or, conversely, must be deemed to 
have admitted that no warrant existed. The court now 
determines [that f]or purposes of this litigation, there was no 
such warrant for the electronic surveillance of any of 
plaintiffs.461 
With no genuine issue of material fact, the district court granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and it later awarded them 
about $41,000 in damages and over $2.5 million in fees and 
expenses.462 The entire amount went to the attorney-plaintiffs, as 
the “[d]istribution of any funds to plaintiff Al-Haramain is 
impossible because Al-Haramain’s assets are blocked as a result 
of its designation as a SDGT organization.”463 Indeed, the district 
court acknowledged that “the government had reason to believe 
that Al-Haramain supported acts of terrorism.”464 In the final 
episode of this long-running litigation, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that the Government enjoyed sovereign immunity from a damage 
action by the organization.465 
Another large number of lawsuits alleged that 
telecommunications companies violated their customers’ rights by 
                                                                                                     
 460. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomm. 
Records Litig.), 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083–86 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing the 
precedent plaintiffs relied on in forming a prima facie case and noting that 
plaintiffs met the requirements for making out a prima facie case). 
 461. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA Telecomm. Records 
Litig.), 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 462. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama (In re NSA Telecomm. Records 
Litig.), No. 06-1791 VRW, at *29, *46 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010), 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/att/alharamainorder122110.pdf. 
 463. Id. at *14. 
 464. Id. at *25. 
 465. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 690 F.3d 1089, 1099 
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity and 
thus the Government still retained it). 
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cooperating and assisting the NSA in surveillance of their 
phones.466 The actions were consolidated as part of the multi-
district litigation panel in northern California.467 While these 
cases were pending in district court, Congress enacted a statutory 
provision rendering an electronic communications service 
provider immune from suit if the Attorney General certified that 
the provider helped the government in intelligence gathering, 
including assistance in executing the TSP.468 Based on this 
provision, the district court dismissed the pending suits against 
the telecommunications companies.469 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, rejecting a series of constitutional arguments, 
including several related to the separation of powers doctrine and 
due process considerations.470  
But in another opinion on the same day, the Ninth Circuit 
allowed a class action suit to proceed against the Government for 
what the plaintiffs described as “a communications dragnet of 
ordinary American citizens.”471 According to the court, the 
                                                                                                     
 466. Among the litigants was Pulitzer Prize-winning author Studs Terkel. 
See generally Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); STUDS 
TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO (1984) 
(containing interviews with people involved in World War Two and winning the 
1985 Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction). 
 467. See NSA Multi-District Litigation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/cases/nsa-multi-district-litigation (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) 
(describing the consolidation and transfer of about forty NSA cases to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 468. See 50 U.S.C. § 1885a–c (2012) (providing that this immunity requires 
the Attorney General to certify the assistance falls into one of five categories). 
 469. In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 976 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009); McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records 
Litig.), No. 09-0131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64621, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 
2009). 
 470. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig.), 671 
F.3d 881, 894–904 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing bicameralism and presentment, 
the nondelegation doctrine, congressional interference with adjudication, and 
notice and process on the way to rejecting the constitutional arguments); see 
also McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig.), 
669 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and 
not reaching the merits of the Fifth Amendment takings claim). 
 471. Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs claimed 
[u]sing [a] shadow network of surveillance devices, Defendants have 
acquired and continue to acquire the content of a significant portion 
of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messages, web 
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plaintiffs had standing by alleging a concrete and particularized 
injury from the collaboration between the government and AT&T 
at a specific facility in San Francisco.472 And although the claims 
“strike . . . at the heart of a major public controversy involving 
national security and surveillance,” the Ninth Circuit refused to 
characterize the legal issues as political questions, or to impose a 
heightened standing requirement for government surveillance 
involving national security interests.473 Where this case will go 
now after the Snowden revelations remains to be seen, but at 
least the Ninth Circuit has shown itself to be the exception in 
standing up against some of the government abuses. 
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA)474 continued the 
authorization of intercepts involving parties outside the United 
States but stipulated that the government may not conduct 
electronic surveillance or intercept wire, oral, or electronic 
communications except pursuant to express statutory 
authorization (for example, FISA).475 This statement of exclusive 
authority should have defused the Executive argument for 
unfettered discretion, but of course we now have public 
admissions of massive government gathering of electronic 
communications data.476 
                                                                                                     
communications and other communications, both international and 
domestic, of practically every American who uses the phone system or 
the Internet, including Plaintiffs and class members, in an 
unprecedented suspicionless general search through the nation's 
communications network.  
Id. at 906. 
 472. See id. at 908 (concluding that the injury was “concrete and 
particularized” and that Jewel thus satisfied the “injury in fact” requirement 
and had standing). 
 473. Id. at 912. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hepting v. AT&T 
Corp., No. 09-422, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8053 (Oct. 9, 2012). 
 474. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 475. See 50 U.S.C. § 1812 (2012) (providing that such communications may 
only be conducted pursuant to the statute’s prescribed procedures or separate 
statutory authorization). 
 476. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans’ E-
mails Before Court Ordered it to Revise its Tactics, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-
thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-
program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html  (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing how the NSA collected tens of thousands of 
Americans’ e-mails annually) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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The ACLU filed suit against the FAA on behalf of a group of 
attorneys, journalists, and legal, media, and human rights 
organizations, arguing that the provision “allows the executive 
branch sweeping and virtually unregulated authority to monitor 
the international communications . . . of law-abiding U.S. citizens 
and residents.”477 The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the government on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring the suit.478 On appeal, a panel of the Second 
Circuit reversed and remanded, asserting that the plaintiffs had 
standing based on a reasonable fear that their sensitive 
international electronic communications were being monitored, 
requiring them to engage in costly and burdensome measures to 
protect the confidentiality of communications necessary for their 
work.479 In September 2011, the Second Circuit denied rehearing 
en banc by an equally divided vote.480  
In February 2013, the Supreme Court reversed on standing 
grounds, agreeing with the Government that the plaintiffs failed 
to show a realistic threat of imminent injury.481 Their 
speculations required assuming that the government would 
target their communications, that authorization under the 
statute would be judicially approved, and that government would 
succeed in acquiring their communications.482 Moreover, the 
plaintiffs’ choices to make expenditures to prevent interception of 
confidential communications based on hypothetical future harm 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 477. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Amnesty Int’l 
USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 CIV 6259). 
 478. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 658 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs’ second standing argument and thus 
denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment). 
 479. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“Because standing may be based on a reasonable fear of future injury . . . and 
the plaintiffs have established that they have a reasonable fear of injury . . . , we 
agree that they have standing. We therefore reverse the district court’s 
judgment.”) 
 480. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(finding the Second Circuit panel did not err and thus affirming its decision). 
 481. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) 
(concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing because they acted pursuant to 
“hypothetical future harm” and not imminent harm). 
 482. See id. at 1148–50 (providing that the plaintiffs’ speculation depended 
on five conditions, none of which could be proven). 
396 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) 
was their own choice and not the direct result of identifiable 
government action.483 
Of course, now we know the assumptions of the Supreme 
Court about judicial authorization of intercepts were unfounded 
because the NSA has been monitoring anything and everything 
that it chooses to monitor.484 This set of assumptions was 
particularly poignant in some of the dissents from the earlier 
Second Circuit denial of rehearing.485 One dissent pointed to the 
FISCR’s opinion in In re Directives as offering “a glimpse into the 
actual world of foreign intelligence targeting,” which “appears 
quite different from the one hypothesized by plaintiffs.”486 
[The FISCR] reviewed the actual procedures adopted by the 
executive to satisfy PAA requirements and found that they in 
fact afforded “protections above and beyond those specified” in 
the statute and adequately allayed any particularity or 
probable cause concerns. . . . Such scrupulous oversight rebuts 
any general assumptions, unsupported by specific facts, that 
the executive will instinctively abuse its targeting discretion 
under the FAA. . . .487 
Now that it is publicly known that the NSA has been 
routinely gathering information on U.S. residents, the assertion 
that the statutes “rebut . . . any general assumption, unsupported 
by specific facts, that the executive will instinctively abuse its 
targeting discretion” rings extremely hollow.488 This is not to say 
that the judges holding that view were knowingly complicit in 
government misdeeds, but they certainly chose consciously to 
turn a blind eye when their colleagues were insisting on scrutiny 
of actual government practices. 
                                                                                                     
 483. See id. at 1153 (finding that plaintiffs’ self-constructed fear was another 
reason they lacked standing). 
 484. See supra notes 382–385, 431–433, and accompanying text (discussing 
the NSA’s ability and willingness to monitor civilians and the public disclosure 
of such behavior). 
 485. See supra note 480 and accompanying text (explaining that the Second 
Circuit denied rehearing en banc in Clapper). 
 486. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 186 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, 
J., dissenting). 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id.  
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2. Judicial Review of Killing U.S. Citizens 
The final case that I wish to highlight here is the “targeted 
killing” of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen who expatriated to 
Yemen and became a major jihadist figure on the Internet.489 
When it was leaked in the press that Anwar al-Aulaqi had been 
placed on the U.S. government’s kill lists, his father Nasser al-
Aulaqi filed suit to assert his son’s rights to due process.490 His 
lawsuit also asserted that the U.S. targeted-killing policy violated 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as treaty and 
customary international law.491 While asking for an injunction to 
stop the government from killing his son, he sought a declaration 
that the policy was illegal and disclosure of the criteria used to 
determine whether to target a U.S. citizen.492  
The D.C. District Court started with the observations that 
this “unique and extraordinary case” presented “[s]tark, and 
perplexing, questions” such as: “How is it that judicial approval is 
required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen 
overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to the 
defendants, judicial scrutiny in prohibited when the United 
States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?”493 Yet, 
the court dismissed the case, holding that Nasser al-Aulaqi 
lacked standing to bring the constitutional claims on behalf of his 
son.494 The court also blindly asserted that there was nothing to 
prevent Anwar al-Aulaqi from peacefully presenting himself at 
the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and announcing his wish to vindicate 
his constitutional rights in court, which, as a matter of domestic 
                                                                                                     
 489. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 490. See id. at 20 (noting that though Al-Aulaqi’s father is the plaintiff in 
the action, his hope to act for his son’s best interest is insufficient to satisfy 
next-friend standing). 
 491. See id. at 12 (listing the plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims).  
 492. See id. (outlining plaintiff’s four requests including a “preliminary 
injunction prohibiting defendants from intentionally killing Anwar Al-Aulaqi” 
and “an injunction ordering defendants to disclose the criteria that the United 
States uses to determine whether a U.S. citizen will be targeted for killing” 
(citing Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9–11, Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469))). 
 493. Id. at 8. 
 494. See id. at 30 (noting that the “plaintiff lacks third party standing . . . 
because his interests do not align with those of his son”). 
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and international law, the U.S. government would have to respect 
without resorting to violence.495 Moreover, it was not clear that 
the father was serving his son’s “best interests,” understood as 
acting in accordance with Anwar al-Aulaqi’s intentions or 
wishes.496 There was no evidence that Nasser al-Aulaqi wanted to 
vindicate his rights in a U.S. court; to the contrary, his public 
statements showed disdain for the American legal system, as well 
as a belief that Muslims were not bound by Western law and it 
was therefore legitimate to violate U.S. law.497  
Moreover, Nasser al-Aulaqi’s claims might have been barred 
by sovereign immunity, because a suit against the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and CIA Director was “tantamount to a suit 
against the United States.”498 In the portion of its opinion most 
strikingly presenting problems of judicial independence, the court 
refused to decide this question by exercising its “equitable 
discretion” to avoid interjecting itself into sensitive issues of 
foreign affairs and activities by the military and intelligence 
community.499 Serious separation-of-powers concerns would be 
raised by a “judicial attempt to enjoin the President in the 
performance of his official duties.”500 The same would be true of a 
court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
nation’s top military and intelligence advisors regarding the use 
of force abroad, when such action was (purportedly) authorized by 
the President himself.501 
                                                                                                     
 495. See id. at 17 (agreeing with defendants that the plaintiff’s son had this 
alternative). 
 496. See id. at 20 (taking as true plaintiff’s statements that he had his son’s 
best interests in mind but finding that the statements were “nonetheless 
insufficient to establish that this lawsuit accords with Anwar Al-Aulaqi's best 
interests”). 
 497. See id. at 19, 21 (concluding that Al-Aulaqui was “incommunicado” due 
to his own choice and noting that Al-Aulaqui “decried the U.S. legal system and 
suggested that Muslims are not bound by Western law” through his public 
statements).  
 498. Id. at 40. 
 499. See id. at 42 (noting that the court did not need to decide the sovereign 
immunity issue as it had “equitable discretion” not to grant plaintiff’s requested 
relief because this was a “‘sensitive’ foreign affairs matter”).  
 500. Id. at 43 (quotations omitted). 
 501. See id. (explaining that a court order against the military or 
intelligence would also evoke separation-of-powers concerns). 
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Finally, in a similar vein, the court concluded that the case 
was a nonjusticiable political question.502 This doctrine exempts 
from judicial review those matters that are committed by the U.S. 
Constitution to the political branches, including the precise issue 
in this case—the decision to employ military force.503 According to 
the court, resolution of the plaintiff’s claims would require it to 
decide: 
(1) [T]he precise nature and extent of Anwar Al-Aulaqi's 
affiliation with AQAP;  
(2) whether AQAP and al Qaeda are so closely linked 
that the defendants' targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi 
in Yemen would come within the United States’ current 
armed conflict with al Qaeda;  
(3) whether (assuming plaintiff's proffered legal standard 
applies)504 Anwar Al-Aulaqi's alleged terrorist activity 
renders him a “concrete, specific, and imminent threat to 
life or physical safety . . . .”; and  
(4) whether there are “means short of lethal force” that 
the United States could “reasonably” employ to address 
any threat that Anwar Al-Aulaqi poses to U.S. national 
security interests. . . . Such determinations, in turn, 
would require this Court . . . to understand and assess 
the “capabilities of the [alleged] terrorist operative to 
carry out a threatened attack, what response would be 
sufficient to address that threat, possible diplomatic 
considerations that may bear on such responses, the 
vulnerability of potential targets that the [alleged] 
terrorist[] may strike, the availability of military and 
nonmilitary options, and the risks to military and 
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nonmilitary personnel in attempting application of 
non-lethal force.”505  
It is truly a mystery why a court should have to decide any of 
those questions to rule on whether a U.S. citizen abroad has due 
process or other legal rights before being executed by executive 
fiat. The judicial function consists of setting out the criteria for 
the Executive to follow in making those decisions.506 The court 
confessed its concern that “there are circumstances in which the 
Executive’s unilateral decision to kill a U.S. citizen overseas is 
‘constitutionally committed to the political branches’ and 
judicially unreviewable” but nonetheless concluded that it was 
barred from adjudicating the merits of the case.507   
The United States then used aerial unmanned aircraft 
(drones) to execute not just Anwar but also his son Abdulrahman 
and a colleague, Samir Khan.508 In July 2012, the ACLU filed a 
new suit on behalf of the families of all three, arguing that the 
killings violated the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable 
seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process, and the Bill 
of Attainder Clause.509 In addition, the ACLU filed a FOIA 
request and subsequent legal action seeking records related to 
legal authority and factual basis for the targeted killing of the 
three individuals.510  
In a masterly display of the various doctrines considered in 
this Article, on December 14, 2012, DOJ filed a motion to dismiss 
the damage action on the grounds of lack of standing, political 
question, qualified immunity, failure to state a claim under due 
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process, and Executive freedom from the Bill of Attainder 
Clause.511 
V. Conclusion 
The “head in the sand” attitude of the U.S. Judiciary in the 
past decade is a rather dismal record that does not fit the high 
standard for judicial independence on which the American public 
has come to rely. Many authors have discussed these cases from 
the perspective of the civil rights and liberties of the individual.512 
What I have attempted to do here is sketch out how the undue 
deference to the Executive in “time of crisis” has undermined the 
independent role of the Judiciary. Torture, executive detentions, 
illegal surveillance, and now killing of U.S. citizens, have escaped 
judicial review under a variety of excuses.513 
To be clear, many of the people against whom these abuses 
have been levied are, or were, very dangerous if not evil 
individuals. Khalid Sheikh Muhamed and Anwar al-Aulaqi 
should not be allowed to roam free to kill innocent civilians. But 
hundreds of years of history show that there are ways of dealing 
with such people within the limits of restrained government 
without resort to the hubris and indignity of unreviewed 
Executive discretion. The turning of blind eyes by many, albeit 
not all, federal judges is a chapter of this history that will weigh 
heavily against us in the future.  
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No judge wants to feel responsible for the deaths of 
innocents. But direct responsibility for death lies with those who 
contribute to the act. Meanwhile, the judge has an ethical 
responsibility for abuses by government of which the Judiciary is 
a part. To illustrate the threat, one federal judge resigned from 
the secret FISA Court in “protest because the Bush 
administration was bypassing the court on warrantless 
wiretaps.”514 To be fair, his public statement before Congress 
included the thought that the judges were independent but not 
making fully informed decisions.515 It makes sense that this 
courageous judge (who also ruled against the Government in a 
major Guantanamo case516) would extol the independence of the 
federal Judiciary, but perhaps those of us outside the club can be 
forgiven for seriously challenging his assessment. Meanwhile, 
critics are voicing the belief that recent appointments to the FISA 
Court will be even more deferential to the Executive.517 
To repeat, there is nothing “new” in the killing of innocents 
for religious or political vengeance.518 This violence has always 
been with us and unfortunately will continue despite our best 
efforts to curb it. Pleas for Executive carte blanche power are 
exactly what judicial independence was developed to avoid, and 
what many statements in various declarations of human rights 
are all about. The way of unreviewed Executive discretion is the 
way of tyranny. 
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